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ABSTRACT
In the first chapter of my thesis, I develop a theoretical model of rehypothe-
cation, a practice in which financial institutions re-use or re-pledge collateral
pledged by their clients for their own purposes. I show that rehypothecation
has trade-off effects; it enhances provision of funding liquidity to the econ-
omy so that additional productive investments can be undertaken, but incurs
deadweight cost by misallocating the asset among the agents when it fails.
Next, I show that the intermediary’s choices of rehypothecation may not
achieve a socially optimal outcome. The direction of the conflict between the
objectives of the intermediary and social efficiency depends on haircuts of the
contract between the intermediary and the borrower; if the contract involves
over-collateralization, there tends to be an excessive use of rehypothecation
by the intermediary, and if the contract involves under-collateralization, there
tends to be an insufficient use of rehypothecation.
In the second chapter, I extend the previous model into a dynamic economy
with aggregate uncertainty that financial intermediaries might default having
repledged their clients’ collateral. I discuss how individual reuse decisions,
allocation of collateral, and aggregate output vary across (i) different tem-
porary shocks and (ii) different persistent shocks. I show that when negative
temporary shocks reduce the borrower’s willingness to allow rehypothecation,
the economy drops further, but it recovers faster. In addition, I show that a
more protracted period of good shocks can lead to a greater fall in output in
the future.
In the third chapter, I consider the competition between direct financing
and rehypothecation. A borrower faces two alternative ways of financing:
one option is to borrow funding directly from a cash holder (direct financ-
ing), another option is to borrow funding through an intermediary (indirect
financing). With direct financing, the borrower delivers collateral directly to
the cash holder with some transaction costs. With indirect financing, the
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borrower delivers collateral to the intermediary who then lends (rehypoth-
ecates) it to the cash holder, and this exposes the borrower with the risk
of losing collateral in case that the intermediary defaults. I investigate how
the severity of the borrower’s moral hazard problem affects the borrower’s
choice between these two alternative ways of financing. If the intermediary’s
default risk is exogenous, as the moral hazard problem gets more severe,
the borrower is less concerned about the default risk of the intermediary,
resulting in indirect financing being chosen more frequently. However, if the
intermediary’s default risk is endogenous, as the moral hazard problem gets
more severe, the cost of indirect financing also increases, resulting in indirect
financing not being chosen in both cases that the severity of the moral hazard
problem is too small or too large.
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To Juhan and my family.
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CHAPTER 1
COLLATERAL, REHYPOTHECATION
AND EFFICIENCY
1.1 Introduction
Most financial contracts are in the form of promises to pay a certain amount
of money or exchange assets on a later date at pre-arranged terms. But often
these promises cannot be warranted themselves, and they need to be backed
by an eligible asset or property, called collateral, such as Treasury bills in
repo transactions and residential houses in mortgage contracts. Generally,
collateral in finanancial contracts plays two crucial roles as emphasized in
Mills and Reed (2012): (i) first, collateral provides a borrower with incentives
to repay to avoid forfeiting it; (ii) second, collateral provides a lender with
some insurance allowing him to collect some revenue by liquidating it in
the event that the borrower defaults. In order that a certain asset can be
used as collateral, however, it has to be sufficiently valuable especially to the
borrower so that the lender can be assured that the borrower will repay the
loan to get back the collateral.
Nonetheless, such assets that can be used as collateral are scarce in the
economy and the cost of generating these assets also non-negligible. In par-
ticular, as the volume of financial transactions has sharply increased over the
last few decades, the demand for collateral has also significantly increased,
and economizing on the existing limited amount of collateral has become an
important issue for market participants.1
Probably the easiest way to save on collateral is by re-using it. In most
cases, collateral sits idle in the lender’s account until the borrower repays the
1Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) estimated the liquidity and safety pre-
mium on Treasuries paid by investors on average from 1926 to 2008 was 72 basis points
per year, which supports the idea that there has been a large and persistent demand for
safe and liquid assets in the economy. Similarly, Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2012)
emphasize the monetary premium embedded in short-term Treasury bills, which has a
lower yield than would be in a conventional asset-pricing literature.
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loan to get it back. Clearly, during the time that the collateral is deposited
in the lender’s account, it ties up capital that the lender might have other
profitable uses for. One way that the lender can access that capital is to
make a loan by re-pledging the collateral (initially pledged by his borrower)
to another party. From the view of liquidity provision, this re-using collateral
is socially beneficial because it reduces the cost of holding collateral for the
lender, and ultimately it would benefit the borrower since the lender would
be willing to provide more funding against the same unit of the collateral
posted by the borrower. From the view of the economy as a whole, the same
collateral is used to support more than one transaction, and it creates a
‘collateral chain’ in the system which increases interdependence among the
agents.
Inarguably, rehypothecation has been one of the most popular devices for
many broker-dealder banks to serve their own funding liquidity needs before
the crisis. However, as reported by Singh (2010, 2011), after the failure of
Lehman Brothers in 2008, rehypothecation significantly dropped as hedge
funds (the clients of those investment banks) became wary of losing access to
their collateral, and limited the amount of the assets that are permitted to be
re-pledged. At the same time, regulation on rehypothecation has also been
advocated by legislators and policy-makers.2 Nevertheless, understaning of
the economics underlying this practice is still incomplete, and there are still
considerable debates on how to regulate rehypothecation, as evidenced by
the wide variation in the rules on rehypothecation across different nations.3
In this chapter, I address some basic, but open questions about this prac-
tice of re-using collateral: under what circumstances ‘rehypothecation’ – the
practice in which the receiver of collateral re-uses, re-pledges, or sometimes
even sells the collateral to another party for its own trading or borrowing –
arises, how it creates a collateral chain in the system; what benefits and costs
it produces, and whether decentralized decisions made by each individual to
participate in rehypothecaion achieves a socially efficient outcome.4
2On the regulatory side, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the collateral in most swap
contracts to be held in a segragated account of a central counterparty.
3Under SEC rule 15c3-3, a prime broker may rehypothecate assets to the value of 140%
of the client’s liability to the prime broker. In the U.K., there is no limit on the amount
that can be rehypothecated. See Monnet (2011) for more detailed explanation on the
difference in regulatory regimes on rehypothecation across countries.
4The material in this chapter is extended in Kahn and Park (2016a). Applications to
policy are considered in Kahn and Park (2016b).
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To answer these questions, I adopt the framework of Bolton and Oehmke
(2014) that is in turn based on Biais, Heider, and Hoerova (2012), in which
a borrower is subject to a moral hazard problem and must post collateral to
prevent him from engaging in risk-taking actions. In this framework, there
can be positive NPV investments which a borrower with limited liability
cannot undertake without posting collateral.5 Previous models, however,
have not considered the risk on the other side that the lender might fail to
return the collateral as well as any incentives to use it for their own purposes.
In contrast, our model incorporates the possibility of re-using collateral by
the counterparty and the risk associated with it, thereby offering the first
formal welfare analysis on rehypothecation.
Another important feature of my model is that the borrower transfers
collateral to the lender at the time of the beginning of the contract. In other
words, collateral is like a repurchase agreement in Mills and Reed (2012): the
borrower transfers his asset to the lender at the time a contract is initiated
and buys it back at a later point. This contrasts to most of the previous
works on collateral in which collateral is transferred to the lender after final
pay-offs are realized, or at the time when the default of the borrower actually
occurs.
This early transfer of collateral, however, introduces the risk that the lender
may not be able to return collateral at the time when the borrower wants
to repurchase it.6 Indeed, as observed from the failure of Lehman Brothers
in 2008 and MF Global in 2011, this is not simply a theoretical possibility.
In consideration of this, I introduce counterparty risk – the lender might be
unable to return the collateral – into the baseline framework, and I show that
if the risk is too high, it makes it too costly for the borrower to post its asset
as collateral. As a result, the positive NPV project of the borrower cannot
be undertaken in this case since non-collateralized borrowing is not feasible
when the borrower is subject to moral hazard.
Building on this basic intuition in the two-player model, I extend it into
5Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998, 2011) shows that the moral hazard problem of the bor-
rower makes the firm’s pledgeable income less than its total value, which leads to a shortage
of liquidity for its investment in some states. Also, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1994), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) concern a firm’s financing
problem constrained by its net wealth.
6Mills and Reed (2012) discuss the effect of this counterparty risk on the form of the
optimal contract in a different context.
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the three-player model to more explicitly describe how rehypothecation intro-
duces the risk of counterparty failure and specifies the condition under which
rehypothecation is socially efficient. Our results show that the efficiency of
rehypothecation is determined by the relative size of the two fundamental
effects. Rehypothecation lowers the cost of holding collateral and makes the
illiquid collateral more liquid, thereby providing more funding liquidity into
the market. On the other hand, rehypothecation failure – the counterparty
failure to return the collateral to the borrower who posted it – may incur
deadweight costs in the economy.
One difficulty in this general argument is that it is not obvious through
which channel the rehypothecation failure incurs deadweight costs, and this
has not been clearly addressed in most of the previous works on rehypothe-
cation7 While there could be several channels through which the rehypoth-
ecation failure incurs deadweight costs in the economy, this paper focuses
on the possibility that rehypothecation failure leads to misallocation of the
assets posted as collateral.
This misallocation of assets crucially depends on the following two types of
market frictions: (i) I assume that the asset is ‘illiquid’ in the sense that the
asset is likely to be more valuable to the initial owner than to other agents –
for example, a stock, bond, or security included in A’s portfolio is likely to fit
better for A’s portfolio but not for the other’s; (ii) I also consider a possibility
that some traders may not have access to some parts of the markets, and they
can trade indirectly each other only through an intermediary (who has an
access to all the markets). In the model, the asset provider and the investor
make separate contracts with the intermediary who transfers the collateral
between them. Taken together, if the intermediary fails, the asset ends up
in the wrong hands: the asset cannot be returned to the initial owner (the
asset provider) who values it the most, but instead it is seized by the third
party (the investor) for whom the collateral may not be as useful.
Finally, I examine whether an individual agent’s decision to participate in
rehypothecation achieves a socially optimal outcome. To answer this ques-
tion, I endogenize each individual’s participation decision in the rehypothe-
cation, and investigate whether their objectives are aligned with social effi-
ciency. I show that in general, the ex-post objective of the intermediary (the
7See the literature review in Kahn and Park (2016a) for further discussion.
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lender of the initial borrower in the model) may conflict with what would be
ex-ante efficient.
The direction of this conflict between the intermediary’s objective and the
socially efficient choice depends on the terms of the contract between the in-
termediary and his borrower. If the contract involves over-collateralization,
in the sense that the value of collateral to the borrower exceeds the pay-
ment for recovering it, there tends to be an excessive use of rehypotheca-
tion by a holder of collateral. Intuitively, this is because when the contract
involves over-collateralization, there is a negative externality of not return-
ing the collateral to the borrower, which is reflected in the spread between
the borrower’s private value on his collateralized asset and the payment for
recovering it. From the perspective of the borrower, he is supposed to re-
purchase the collateral at a price lower than his valuation on it. However,
the intermediary does not internalize this private cost to the borrower from
failure of returning collateral, and thus he sometimes wants to participate
in rehypothecation even when rehypothecation is inefficient – that is, when
the social cost (which includes this private cost to the borrower from rehy-
pothecation failure) exceeds the benefit. Similarly, if the contract involves
under-collateralization, there tends to be an insufficient use of rehypotheca-
tion.
1.2 A Baseline Model
There are two periods, date 0 and date 1, and two types of agents in the
economy, a firm A and an outside investor B. All agents are risk-neutral and
consume at the end of date 1. For simplicity, the price of date 1 consumption
good is normalized to be 1.
At date 0, firm A has an opportunity of an investment which requires an
immediate input at date 0 to produce an outcome at date 1. We assume
that the outcome of the investment is uncertain and can take two values; if
the investment succeeds, the investment produces R > 1 units of the date 1
good (measured per unit of inputs) and if it fails, it produces zero units,
outcome of investment =
R if the investment succeeds0 otherwise. (1.1)
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These outcomes are costlessly observable to the outside investors.
However, at date 0, A is endowed with no capital that can be spent as an
input for his investment, but only one unit of indivisible asset which is illiquid
in the following two senses. First, it yields the consumption goods only at
the end of date 1. Second, it produces more output when it is in the hands
of the initial owner, firm A, than in the hands of the outside investor, B –
think of the asset as an intermediate good that the initial owner uses it for
its own production and he has a better skill to manage it than do the other
agents in the economy. Specifically, I assume that the asset yields Z units of
the good if it is held by A at the end of date 1, while it yields Z0(< Z) units
of the good if it is held by B at that time.
On the other hand, the outside investor B is endowed with a large amount
of capital that can be spent as an input for A’s investment. Thus, A cannot
undertake the project alone, and has to borrow capital from B. For simplicity,
we assume that A tries to borrow funds for his investment from B by issuing
simple debt; A receives cash from B at date 0 by promising to pay a certain
amount of his investment outcome to B at date 1.
1.2.1 Moral Hazard and Limited Liability
Following the approach of Bolton and Oehmke (2014), we assume that the
probability of the success of the borrower’s investment depends on his hidden
action. We assume that A can choose either a safe or a risky action, denoted
by a ∈ {s, r} where a = s represents the safe action and a = r represents
the risky action. The safe action leads to a high probability of success of the
investment, which we take for simplicity to be 1 and the risky action lower
probability of success, p < 1,
probability of success =
1 if A takes safe action (a = s)p if A takes risky action (a = r). (1.2)
On the other hand, the risky action gives firm A a private benefit b > 0
(measured per unit of inputs).
Taken together, the (expected) average return of the investment is given
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by
return of the investment =
R if A takes safe action (a = s)pR + b if A takes risky action (a = r).
(1.3)
In addition we assume that the parameters satisfy the following two as-
sumptions.
Assumption 1. min{R, pR + b} > 1 > pR.
The first inequality implies that it is efficient for A to undertake the
project regardless of his action. The second inequality implies that, from
the persepective of B, it is profitable only if A takes the safe action. To un-
derstand the second inequality, suppose B invests capital I into A’s project.
Then, if A takes the safe action, the maximum level of the expected payment
by A is RI, which is greater than the investment cost I by the first inequal-
ity, and if A takes the risky action, it reduces to pRI (note that the private
benefit bI cannot be pledgeable), which is smaller than the investment cost
I by the second inequality.
Assumption 2. R− 1 < p(R− 1) + b.
This assumption implies that when A invests with the borrowed money
from B, A will always find it profitable to take the risky action rather than
the safe action for any given contract (I,X) such thatX ≥ I (or, equivalently,
for any contract with a positive interest rate). To see this, notice that the
left side represents A’s expected net surplus (per unit of the inputs) after
paying out the investment cost to B if he takes the safe action and the right
side represents A’s expectied net surplus if he takes the risky action.
Combining assumptions 1 and 2, one can conclude that A cannot borrow
funds for his investment from B, because B expects that A will take the risky
action after borrowing, and he will end up with negative profit. Formally,
Assumption 2 implies that A will always take the risky action after borrowing,
and the expected loan payment by A will be at most pR (per unit of inputs),
but this is not enough to cover the cost that B spent for A’s project due to
Assumption 1.
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1.2.2 Benchmark: Uncollateralized Borrowing
Let us start by considering the contracting problem between A and B where
A issues debt which is solely backed by the future return of the investment.
For simplicity, we assume that A has all the bargaining power and makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to B. We assume that B’s outside option pays utility
of J ≥ 0, and B will accept the offer as long as he can receive utility greater
or at least equal to J .
Timing is as follows. At date 0, A borrows the investment cost, denoted
by Ia, from B, and then takes either the safe or risky action, denoted by
a ∈ {s, r}. At date 1, the investment outcome is realized and A pays a part
of the return of the investment, denoted by Xa, to B (hereafter, the subscript
a stands for which type of action is taken by A).
Note that depending on A’s action, the optimal contract takes either of
the two forms: in one case, A takes the safe action and in the other case, A
takes the risky action. Let us first consider the case in which A takes the
safe action, a = s. In this case, the contracting problem is to choose (Is, Xs)
which solves the following maximization problem.
max
Is,Xs
RIs −Xs (1.4)
subject to
RIs −Xs ≥ p(RIs −Xs) + bIs (ICs)
Xs − Is ≥ J (Ps)
RIs ≥ Xs (Rs)
The objective function is A’s expected utility when A takes the safe action.
With probability 1, the investment yields the return RIs and A has the
remaining amount after paying off the loan Xs out of this to B. The incentive
constraint (ICs) implies that A’s expected profit when A takes the safe action
on the left side is greater than that when A takes the risky action on the
right hand side. The participation constraint (Ps) ensures that B’s expected
profit from lending cannot be less than the reservation value J . Lastly, the
resource constraint (Rs) says that A cannot pay more than what he has, that
is, the payment is bounded above by the return from the investment when it
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succeeds, RIs (note that if the investment fails, it yields zero ouput, and A
does not make any payments to B).
Next, consider the case in which A takes the risky action, a = r. In this
case, the contracting problem is to choose (Ir, Xr) which solves the following
problem,
max
Ir,Xr
p(RIr −Xr) + bIr (1.5)
subject to
RIr −Xr ≤ p(RIr −Xr) + bIr (ICr)
pXr − Ir ≥ J (Pr)
RIr ≥ Xr (Rr)
The objective function is A’s expected utility when A takes the risky action.
A obtains the return RIr from the investment and pays off the loan Xr with
probability p and also receives the private benefit bIr from misbehavior. The
incentive constraint (ICr) implies that A’s expected profit when A takes the
risky action which is on the right hand side is greater than that when A takes
the safe action which is on the left hand side. The participation constraint
(Pr) and the resource constraint (Rr) are the same as in the previous case.
Taking the two subcases together, the optimal contract is to choose a
profile of (Ia, Xa, a) where a ∈ {s, r} which solves the following problem.
max
a∈{s,r}
1S(a)(RIs −Xs) + (1− 1S(a))[p(RIr −Xr) + bIr] (1.6)
where 1S(·) is the indicator function where S = {s} and (Is, Xs) solves
subproblem (1.4) and (Ir, Xr) solves subproblem (1.5).
However, the solution to the maximization problem above may not exist
under some parameter values. In other words, it may not be feasible to
finance A’s project by issuing simple debt, which is solely backed by the
future return of the project.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Then, uncollateralized debt
financing for A’s project is not feasible.
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1.2.3 Collateralized Borrowing
In the previous section, we showed that A’s project cannot be funded with
uncollateralized debt if Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Suppose now that A
is required to post his endowed asset, which is worth Z to A himself and
Z0 < Z to B, as collateral. In this section, we show that in such case, posting
collateral helps A’s investment to be funded in the following two ways: (i)
posting collateral incentivizes A to take the safe action by introducing the risk
of forfeiting it if he defaults; (ii) collateral provides B with some compensation
in case that A defaults by allowing B to seize it.
To show this formally, let us consider the contracting problem between A
and B when A posts his asset as collateral. As before, A is assumed to have
all the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to B. At date
0, A borrows the investment cost Ia from B and deposits his endowed asset
in B’s account (or, pledges it as collateral), and then takes either the safe
or risky action, a ∈ {s, r}. At date 1, if the investment succeeds, A makes
the promised payment Xa to B, or if the investment fails, A defaults and B
seizes the asset posted by A.
As in the previous section, in order to solve for the optimal contract, we
consider the two possible cases separately. First, we begin with the case in
which A takes the safe action, a = s. The contracting problem between A
and B in this case is to choose (Is, Xs) to solve the following maximization
problem.
max
Is,Xs
RIs −Xs (1.7)
subject to
RIs −Xs ≥ p(RIs −Xs) + bIs − (1− p)Z (IC ′s)
Xs − Is ≥ J (P ′s)
RIs ≥ Xs (R′s)
The objective function is as before. The incentive constraint (IC ′s) now has
the additional term −(1 − p)Z on the right hand side. This captures the
fact that there is now an additional loss from taking the risky action, which
is calculated by the probability of default, 1 − p times the private value of
collateral to A, Z. In constrast, if A takes the safe action, A will always get
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back his collateral. Hence, when posting collateral, the return when taking
the safe action increases relative to that when taking the risky action, thereby
incentivizing A to take the safe action. The participation constraint (P ′s) and
the resource constraint (R′s) are the same as before.
Next, consider the case in which A takes the risky action. In this case, the
contracting problem is to choose (Ir, Xr) which solves the following problem,
max
Ir,Xr
p(RIr −Xr) + bIr − (1− p)Z (1.8)
subject to
RIr −Xr ≤ p(RIr −Xr) + bIr − (1− p)Z (IC ′r)
pXr − Ir + (1− p)Z0 ≥ J (P ′r)
RIr ≥ Xr (R′r)
The objective function is A’s expected utility when A takes the risky action
which is the same as before except that there is additional term −(1− p)Z,
which captures the cost of losing collateral in case of default with probability
1 − p when A takes the risky action. The incentive constraint (IC ′r) shows
that compared to the case without collateral, the return from taking the
risky action on the right hand side decreases by (1 − p)Z due to the loss of
value from forfeiting it in case of default. The participation constraint (P ′r)
has the additional term (1−p)Z0, which means the compensation value that
B earns from liquidating collateral, Z0, if A defaults with probability 1− p.
Again the resource constraint (R′r) is the same as in the previous case.
Taking these together, the optimal solution is a profile of (Ia, Xa, a) which
solves the following problem.
max
a∈{s,r}
1S(a)(RIs −Xs) + (1− 1S(a))[p(RIr −Xr) + bIr − (1− p)Z] (1.9)
where 1S(·) is the indicator function where S = {s} and (Is, Xs) solves
subproblem (1.7) and (Ir, Xr) solves subproblem (1.8).
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Optimal Contract
Our next result shows that if B’s outside utility J is sufficiently small, there
exists a solution to the problem described above, and to characterize it.
Proposition 1 (Optimal Contract under Collateralized Borrowing). Suppose
Assumption 1 and 2 hold. If J ≤ min
{
1−p
b
(R−1)Z, 1−p
b
(pR + b(Z0/Z)− 1)Z
}
,
there exists an optimal solution to problem (1.9). In this solution
(Ia, Xa; a) =

(
Z−J
1−B ,
Z−BJ
1−B ; s
)
if Us ≥ Ur(
(1−p)Z0−J
1−pR , R
(1−p)Z0−J
1−pR ; r
)
if Us < Ur
(1.10)
where B ≡ R− b
1−p , Us ≡ RIs −Xs, and Ur ≡ (pR+ b)Ir − pXr − (1− p)Z.
Depending on parameter values, either the safe or the risky action can
arise in the optimal contract. In either case, the participation constraint is
binding at the optimum; player B receives exactly J in value.
In the subcase where the risky action is optimal (a = r) the resource
constraint is also binding; thus Ir and Xr are defined by the two equalities:
pXr + (1− p)Z0 = J + Ir (1.11)
RIr = Xr (1.12)
In other words, when the investment is successful the entirety of the payout
is given to B. Since this is not enough alone to compensate for the initial
investment by B, the remnant of the compensation comes from the value of
the collateral to B; the more valuable the collateral, the larger the initial
investment.
Roughly speaking, the parameter J measures the profitability of B’s lend-
ing activity. If lending is sufficiently competitive (J close to 0), the invest-
ment in the risky subcase tends to be undercollateralized; at least relative to
B’s valuation, collateral is less than the required repayment, Z0 < Xr.
In the subcase where the safe action is optimal repayment cannot be pushed
to the limit of the resource constraint, for if A were forced to pay out the full
amount of the proceeds of the investment, he would not be willing to take
the safe action. Instead the incentive constraint binds first, and so Is and Xs
are defined by the two equalities:
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RIs −Xs = p(RIs −Xs) + bIs − (1− p)Z (1.13)
Xs − Is = J (1.14)
As before, increases in the value of the collateral relax the constraints on
the problem and increase the amount of investment. Here, however, the rele-
vant value is the value to the borrower, not the lender, because the collateral
is being used as an incentive, not a repayment. Again roughly speaking,
the need to maintain the incentives for safe behavior increases the collateral
needed to back the borrowing. As J approaches 0, whether this extra con-
sideration is sufficient to lead to overcollateralization depends on the sign of
the quantity B; if it is negative, then Xs < Z.
The effect of parameter values on the choice between the safe and risky
subcases can be analyzed by using the results of the proposition. For example
in the case where J = 0 and p = 0, the formulas for A’s utility under the two
subcases reduce to
Us =
(R− 1)Z
1 + b−R, Ur = bZ0 − Z.
The risky action becomes relatively more attractive as the private benefit
b increases and B’s evaluation of collateral, Z0, increases. The safe action
becomes relatively more attractive as its return increases and as the value to
A of retaining the collateral increases.
1.3 Rehypothecation model
1.3.1 Players and Endowments
There are three periods, date 0, 1 and 2, and three players, A, B, and C. I
assume that all the agents are risk-neutral and consume only at the end of
date 2. For simplicity, I take the price of date 2 consumption good to be 1.
At date 0, A has an opportuntiy of an investment which has the same
feature as in the previous baseline model, except that it produces the outcome
after two periods, at date 2, not date 1. Also, I assume that at date 0, A
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is endowed with a single unit of indivisible illiquid asset, which is again the
same as in the previous model, except that it yields the goods at the end
of date 2. On the other hand, B is endowed with a large amount of capital
which can be used as an input for A’s investment at date 0.
At date 1, B has an investment opportunity which requires an immediate
input at that time to produce an outcome at date 2, but B does not have
capital that can be spent as an input for his project nor any other pledgeable
assets.8 On the other hand, C does not have access to B’s investment, but has
a large amount of capital that can be spent as an input for B’s investment.
Thus, in order that B’s investment is undertaken, capital must be transferred
from C to B. As in the previous section, I assume that B issues simple debt
to borrow funds for his investment; B borrows funds from C at date 1 by
promising to pay a part of his investment outcome to C at date 2.
B’s project produces a positive outcome, Y (measured per unit of the
investment cost) if it succeeds or zero if it fails. Let θ be the probability of
success.
outcome of B’s investment =
Y with prob. θ0 with prob. 1− θ (1.15)
In addition, B’s investment is productive in the sense that the expected re-
turn of B’s investment is greater than the investment cost (both are measured
per unit of inputs).
Assumption 3. θY > 1 .
However, the outcome of B’s investment is not verifiable to its creditor, C.
For example, even when the project succeeds, B can falsely report that his
investment fails, and can avoid paying the loan to C. This implies that debt
financing solely backed by the future return of the investment is not feasible
for B.9
8Equivalently, I can assume that B’s endowment at date 0 cannot be storable until the
next period when he wants to use it as an input for his investment, for example, B faces
a liquidity mismatch problem.
9In general, I may assume that some of the future return of B’s investment can be
pledgeable, but as long as it is not fully pledgeable, B cannot raise enough funding for the
investment soley backed by its future returns.
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1.3.2 Sequential Contracts: Collateral Chain
Suppose B is now allowed to repledge A’s collateral deposited in his account
to borrow funds from C, in other words, B can rehypothecate A’s collateral.
This can help to raise funds for B’s investment, which otherwise cannot
be funded on its own. By posting A’s collateral, B can assure C that he
will make the payment to recover the collateral, so that he can receive the
payment by returning it to A – note that in effect the debt between A and
B is also transferred to C when the collateral is transferred from B to C.10
In addition, collateral provides some compensation to C even by allowing C
to seize the collateral in case that B defaults.
Formally, under rehypothecation, the same single unit of collateral is used
to support more than one transaction, the contract between A and B at date
0 and that between B and C at date 1, thereby creating collateral chain in the
economy. In this three-period model, these two contracts arise sequentially,
and the timing of the model is as follows.
• At date 0, A borrows funds for his investment, denoted by I†a, from B
by pledging his asset, which is worth Z to himself and Z0(< Z) to the
others, and promises to pay a part of the investment outcome, denoted
by X†a, to B, conditional B’s returning collateral to A. After entering
the contract, A then takes an action, either safe or risky, a ∈ {s, r}.
• At date 1, B has an investment opportuntiy, and decides whether to
repledge A’s collateral and undertake the investment, or keep A’s col-
lateral to return it safely to A in the next period. If B decides to rehy-
pothecate, B borrows funds for his investment, denoted by I‡a, from C
by repledging A’s collateral, and promises to pay a part of the invest-
ment outcome, denoted by X‡a, to C for recovering A’s collateral from
C.
• At date 2, both A’s and B’s investment outcomes are realized and the
contracts are executed according to the prearranged terms. If B pays
10For the transferability of debt, see Kahn and Roberds (2007) and Donaldson and
Micheler (2015). As the conditions for debt to be transferable, Kahn and Roberds (2007)
assume that the debtor and an entity who holds the debt claim can meet at some point in
the future and the enforceability of debts does not diminish when it is transferred between
agents. In our model, neither of these two conditions hold, and debt can be transferrable
only when the collateral supporting it is transferred simultaneously.
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X‡a he repurchases A’s collateral from C, and then returns it to A to
receive X†a. However, if B defaults, C seizes A’s collateral repledged by
B, and it cannot be returned to A, while at the same time, A is also
exempt from paying the loan X†a to B.
1.4 Model Solution
Next, I solve for the optimal contract in this model. Throughout this section,
I focus on the case in which B’s decision whether to rehypothecate A’s col-
lateral at date 1 is exogenously given – I will endogenize this into the model
later on. First, consider the case in which B does not rehypothecate A’s
collateral at date 1. In that case, the model involves only one contract made
between A and B, and effectively, it boils down to the previous two-player
model.
Next, consider the case in which B rehypothecates at date 1. In that case,
the model has a sequence of two contracts, the date 0 contract between A and
B and the date 1 contract between B and C. Formally, the date 0 contract
between A and B is defined as a profile (I†a, X
†
a; a) where I
†
a represents the
investment cost that A borrows from B by pledging his asset as collateral at
date 0, X†a represents the payment promised by A to pay for getting back
his asset from B at date 2, and a ∈ {s, r} denotes the type of action taken
by A. Similarly, the date 1 contract between B and C is defined by a profile
(I‡a, X
‡
a) where I
‡
a represents the investment cost that B borrows from C by
repledging A’s collateral at date 1 and X‡a represents the payment promised
by B to repurchase A’s collateral from C at date 2, and similarly as above,
these also depend on the type of action taken by A, a ∈ {s, r}.
To solve for the optimal solution to this problem, I use backward induction;
first, I solve for the contracting problem between B and C at date 1 by
taking the date 0 contract between A and B as given, and then solve for the
contracting problem between A and B at date 0.
1.4.1 Contracting Problem between B and C at Date 1
Let us consider the contracting problem between B and C at date 1. I assume
that B has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
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C, and if C rejects the offer, C receives reservation value 0. In the case in
which A takes the safe action, a = s, the contracting problem between B and
C is to choose (I‡s , X
‡
s) which solves the following maximization problem.
max
I‡s ,X‡s
θ(Y I‡s −X‡s +X†s) (1.16)
subject to
I‡s ≤ θX‡s + (1− θ)Z0 (Pc)
X‡s ≤ X†s (R)
The objective function is B’s expected utility when he makes the invest-
ment with cash borrowed by repledging A’s collateral. With probability θ,
the investment returns Y I‡s , and B pay a part of the return X
‡
s to repurchase
A’s collateral from C, and then B delivers this collateral to receive X†s from
A. The participation constraint (PC) states that C’s utility must be at least
the reservation value, 0. The right side of (PC) is the expected revenue from
lending; C receives X‡s from B with probability θ and Z0 by seizing the collat-
eral when B defaults with probability 1− θ. The left side of (PC) is the cost
I‡s that C provides to B’s investment. The last constraint (R) is the resource
constraint which implies that B’s promise, X‡s , cannot be greater than what
B is going to earn by recovering the collateral from C, the expected payment
that B would receive by returning the collateral to A, X†s . If this does not
hold, B will find it more profitable not to recover the collateral from C.
In the case in which A takes the risky action, the contracting problem is
to choose (I ′‡r , X
‡
r ) which solves the following problem.
max
I‡r ,X‡r
θ(Y I‡r −X‡r + pX†r + (1− p)Z0) (1.17)
subject to
I‡r ≤ θX‡r + (1− θ)Z0 (P ′c)
X‡r ≤ pX†r + (1− p)Z0 (R′)
The objective function is B’s expected profit. With probability θ, B’s
investment returns θY I‡r , and B repurchases A’s collateral from C at a pre-
17
arranged price X‡r , and then with probability p, B receives X
†
r from A in
exchange for the collateral when A’s investment succeeds and with proba-
bility 1 − p, seizes the collateral (which is worth Z0 to B) when A defaults.
The participation constraint (P ′c) is the same as (PC), which implies that
C’s utility must be at least the reservation value, 0. Lastly, the constraint
(R′) implies that B’s promise, X‡r , cannot be greater what he is going to
earn by recovering the collateral from C; B receives X†s from A in exchange
for the collateral with probability p and Z0 by seizing it if A defaults with
probability 1− p.
Then, Assumption 3 and the linearity of the problem ensure that in both
cases, all the constraints are binding at the optimum, and by solving these
equations simultaneously, I can write the optimal contract at date 1 as a
function of the date 0 contract.
Lemma 2. Suppose Assumption 3 holds and the date 0 contract between A
and B is given. Then, the optimal contract between B and C at date 1 can
be written as a function of the date 0 contract between A and B, (I†s , X
†
s) if
A takes the safe action and (I†r , X
†
r ) if A takes the risky action.
(I‡a, X
‡
a) =
(θX†s + (1− θ)Z0, X†s) if a = s(pθX†r + (1− pθ)Z0, pX†r + (1− p)Z0) if a = r (1.18)
In other words, B passes the collateral along to C. If neither A nor B fails,
A’s payment X† is passed along to C. Otherwise C retains the collateral
valued at Z0. The weighted average of these two quantities is the amount
that C lends to B.
1.4.2 Contracting Problem between A and B at date 0
Moving backward, I consider the contracting problem between A and B at
date 0. First, I consider the case in which A takes the safe action. To
facilitate analysis, I plug the results in Lemma 2 into the objective function
of the date 1 problem, so that B’s expected utility can be written as a function
of (I†s , X
†
s) as follows.
θ(Y I‡s −X‡s +X†s)− I†s = θY (θX†s + (1− θ)Z0)− I†s . (1.19)
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Again, I assume that A has all the bargaining power and makes a take-it-
or-leave-it offer to B, and if B rejects the offer, he receives reservation value,
J > 0. In this case, the contracting problem is to choose (I†s , X
†
s) which
solves the following problem.
max
I†s ,X†s
RI†s − θX†s − (1− θ)Z (1.20)
subject to
RI†s − θX†s − (1− θ)Z ≥ p(RI†s − θX†s) + bI†s − (1− pθ)Z (ICs)
θY [θX†s + (1− θ)Z0]− I†s ≥ J (Pb)
RI†s ≥ X†s (Rs)
The objective function is A’s expected utility when A takes the safe action
where 1− θ is the probability of default of B. The incentive constraint (ICs)
implies that A prefers to take the safe action rather than the risky action,
which is the same as in the previous two-player model when the counterparty
risk is 1 − θ. The participation constraint (Pb) implies that B’s utility (in
case that he is supposed to rehypothecate A’s collateral at date 1) must be
at least his outside utility, J . Lastly, the resource constraint (Rs) implies
that A cannot promise to pay more than what he has, i.e., the return from
the investment, RI†s , since he has no other source of income.
Next, consider the case in which A takes the risky action. Again, I write B’s
utility as a function of the date 0 contract, (I†r , X
†
r ) by plugging the results in
Lemma 2 into the objective function of the date 1 problem described above.
θ(Y I‡r −X‡r + pX†r + (1− p)Z0)− I†r = θY [pθX†r + (1− pθ)Z0]− I†r . (1.21)
Then, the contracting problem between A and B at date 0 is to choose
(I†r , X
†
r ) which solves the following problem.
max
I†r ,X†r
(pR + b)I†r − pθX†r − (1− pθ)Z (1.22)
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subject to
RI†r − θX†r − (1− θ)Z ≤ p(RI†r − θX†r ) + bI†r − (1− pθ)Z (ICr)
θY [pθX†r + (1− pθ)Z0]− I†r ≥ J (P ′B)
RI†r ≥ X†r (Rr)
The objective function is A’s expected utility when A takes the risky action
where p is the probability of the success of A’s investment and 1 − θ is the
probability that B loses A’s collateral. The incentive constraint (ICr) is the
reverse of (ICs), which implies that A prefers to take the risky action than
the safe action. The participation constraint (P ′B) and the resource constraint
(Rr) are the same as before.
Taken together, the optimal date 0 contract between A and B is a profile
(I†a, X
†
a; a) which solves the following problem.
max
a∈{s,r}
1S(a)[RI
†
s−θX†s−(1−θ)Z]+(1−1S(a))[(pR+b)I†r−pθX†r−(1−pθ)Z]
(1.23)
where S = {s} and (I†s , X†s) solves subproblem (1.20) and (I†r , X†r ) solves
subproblem (1.22).
To solve for this problem, I make the following two parametric assump-
tions on θ and Y to maintain consistency between this extended model with
rehypothecation and the previous baseline model without rehypothecation.
Assumption 4. max{θ2Y R, θY (pR + b)} > 1 > pθ2Y R.
Assumption 4 is analogous to Assumption 1 in the baseline model, which
implies that it is efficient for A to undertake the project regardless of his
action, but from the perspective of B, providing funds for A’s project is
profitable only if A takes the safe action. Suppose A’s collateral is worthless
to B and C, that is, Z0 = 0. Then, the expected repayment from A can be
up to θR (per unit of inputs) if A takes the safe action, and pθR (per unit
of inputs) when A takes the risky action – note that B cannot receive the
payment from A in case that B defaults with probability 1− θ. However, the
total profit to B is multiplied by θY > 1 since B can repledge the payment
from A and invest that amount into his project with expected unit return
of θY . To summarize, this assumption implies that even in the case that B
rehypothecates, it is efficient for A to undertake the project, but from the
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persepective of B, A’s project is efficient only if A takes the safe action.
Assumption 5. R− θR < p(R− θR) + b.
Similarly, Assumption 5 is analogous to Assumption 2 when A’s payment
can be up to θR (which might be either greater or smaller than 1. The left side
is A’s expected net surplus after paying the loan to B if A takes the safe action
and the right side is that if A takes the risky action. Again, Assumption 4
and 5 together imply that, when B is supposed to rehypothecate, A must
post collateral in order to borrow funding for his project.
Then, I show that as long as B’s outside utility, J is sufficiently small,
there exists a solution to the problem.
Lemma 3. Suppose Assumption 3, 4, and 5 hold. If J ≤ min
{
(1−θ)θY Z0+
θ(θ2Y R−1)
θR−B Z, (1 − pθ)Z0 − θ(1−pθ
2Y R)
θR−B Z
}
, there exists an optimal solution to
problem (1.23).
And this optimal solution, denoted by (I†a, X
†
a; a), takes the following form.
(I†a, X
†
a; a) =

(
θY [θZ+(1−θ)Z0]−J
1−BθY ,
Z+(1−θ)BY Z0−(θ/B)J
1−BθY ; s
)
if U †s ≥ U †r(
(1−pθ)θY Z0−J
1−pθ2Y R ,
(1−pθ)θY RZ0−RJ
1−pθ2Y R ; r
)
if U †s < U
†
r
(1.24)
where B ≡ R − b
1−p , U
†
s ≡ RI†s − θX†s − (1 − θ)Z, and U †r ≡ (pR + b)I†r −
pθX†r − (1− pθ)Z.
Finally, taking all the results obtained so far together, the optimal contract
in this rehypothecation model can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 3, 4, 5 hold, and J ≤ min
{
(1 −
θ)θY Z0 +
θ(θ2Y R−1)
θR−B Z, (1−pθ)Z0− θ(1−pθ
2Y R)
θR−B Z
}
. The optimal contract under
rehypothecation is a profile (I†a, X
†
a, I
‡
a, X
‡
a; a) where a ∈ {s, r} such that
(I†a, X
†
a, I
‡
a, X
‡
a; a) =

(
I†s , X
†
s , I
‡
s , X
‡
s ; s
)
if U †s ≥ U †r(
I†r , X
†
r , I
‡
r , X
‡
r ; r
)
if U †s < U
†
r
(1.25)
21
where
(I†s , X
†
s) =
(θY [θZ + (1− θ)Z0]− J
1− BθY ,
Z + (1− θ)BY Z0 − (θ/B)J
1− BθY
)
,
(I†r , X
†
r ) =
((1− pθ)θY Z0 − J
1− pθ2Y R ,
(1− pθ)θY RZ0 −RJ
1− pθ2Y R
)
,
(I‡s , X
‡
s) = (θX
†
s + (1− θ)Z0, X†s),
(I‡r , X
‡
r ) = (pθX
†
r + (1− pθ)Z0, pX†r + (1− p)Z0),
B ≡ R − b
1−p , U
†
s ≡ RI†s − θX†s − (1 − θ)Z, and U †r ≡ (pR + b)I†r − pθX†r −
(1− pθ)Z.
To summarize, the optimal solution to the rehypothecation model consists
of the inital contract between A and B and the subsequent constract between
B and C and the solution uniquely exists under some reasonable assumptions
on parameters.
1.5 Welfare Analysis: Trade-off Effects of
Rehypothecation
In this section, I evaluate the social welfare with and without rehypotheca-
tion, and compare them to examine the benefits and costs of rehypothecation
in the economy. I illustrate the components of the trade-off: On one side,
rehypothecation helps provide more funding liquidity to the economy so that
additional productive investment can be undertaken, by enabling the agent
to use the limited amount of collateral to support multiple transactions. On
the other side, it introduces the additional risk that the intermediary might
default having repledged his borrower’s collateral to the third party, which
is often called ‘rehypothecation failure.’
One potential cost associated with this failure of the intermediary is the
deadweight cost of misallocating the asset, which arises in the presence of
illiquidity of the asset and trading frictions; for example, the initial owner
of the asset is likely to put a higher value on it than the other agents in
the market, and if the intemediary repledges the initial owner’s collateral
to the third party, it is likely to be the case that this third party and the
initial owner are indirectly connected through the intermediary, and they
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cannot trade on their own. This implies that, if the intermediary fails, or
equivalently, rehypothecation fails, the asset remains with the third party to
whom it is less valuable than to its initial owner.
Formally, if B rehypothecates A’s collateral, the social welfare, denoted by
WR, can be represented by the sum of A’s, B’s and C’s utility, respectively.
First, in the case that A takes the safe action, the social welfare is given by
WR(a = s) =[RI
†
s − θX†s + θZ − Z] + [θY¯ I‡s − θX‡s + θX†s − I†s ]
+ [θX‡s + (1− θ)Z0 − I‡s ]. (1.26)
where (I†a, X
†
a, I
‡
a, X
‡
a)a∈{s,r} are from Proposition 2.
Similarly, in the case that A takes the risky action, the social welfare is
given by
WR(a = r) = [(pR + b)I
†
r − pθX†r + pθZ − Z]
+ [θY I‡r − θX‡r + pθX†r + (1− p)θZ0 − I†r ] + [θX‡r + (1− θ)Z0 − I‡r ].
(1.27)
Simplifying, the social welfare under rehypothecation takes the following
form.
WR ≡
(R− 1)I†s + (θY − 1)I‡s − (1− θ)(Z − Z0) if a = s(pR + b− 1)I†r + (θY − 1)I‡r − (1− pθ)(Z − Z0) if a = r
(1.28)
In other words, the social welfare under rehypothecation consists of three
components: (i) the surplus generated from A’s investment, which is captured
by the terms (R − 1)I†s and (pR + b − 1)I†r ; (ii) the surplus generated from
B’s investment, which is captured by the terms (θY − 1)I‡s and (θY − 1)I‡r ;
and (iii) the cost generated from the misallocation of the asset in case of
rehypothecation failure, which is captured by the terms (1− θ)(Z −Z0) and
(1− pθ)(Z − Z0).
On the other hand, if rehypothecation is not allowed, the social welfare,
denoted by W0, consists of A’s utility and B’s utility only, since further
transactions between B and C cannot happen. Using the same approach as
above, I can show that the social welfare without rehypothecation takes the
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following form.
W0 ≡
(R− 1)Is if a = s(pR + b− 1)Ir − (1− p)(Z − Z0) if a = r (1.29)
where (Ia, Xa)a∈{s,r} are from Proposition 1. Note that the surplus is now
generated only from A’s investment, since B’s investment cannot be under-
taken. Also, provided that A’s choice of action is not changed whether B
rehypothecates or not,11 rehypothecation tends to increase the cost of misal-
locating the asset from 0 to (1−θ)(Z−Z0) if a = s, and from (1−p)(Z−Z0)
to (1 − pθ)(Z − Z0) if s = r. This is because rehypothecation introduces
the model with the risk that the counterparty B loses A’s collateral, which
occurs with the probability 1− θ.
As a result, the efficiency of rehypothecation is determined by the relative
size of these trade-off effects discussed so far. It enhances the provision of
funding liquidity to the system so that additional productive investment can
be undertaken, B’s investment at date 1 in our model, but it introduces the
counterparty risk to lose collateral, which may incur the deadweight loss by
allocating the asset inefficiently.
1.6 Conflict between Intermediary’s Ex-Post Decision
to Rehypothecate and Ex-Ante Efficiency
I have so far assumed that B’s (the intermediary’s) decision to rehypothecate
at date 1 is exogenously given. In this section, I relax this assumption and
assume that it is endogenously determined within the model. B can decide
whether to rehypothecate A’s collateral or not when the investment opportu-
nity arrives at date 1, by comparing the expected return if he rehypothecates
A’s collateral for the investment versus the expected return if he just keeps it
safe until A makes the payment for recovering it from B at a later date. The
question is then whether this decision made by B achieves a socially optimal
outcome or not, in other words, whether B’s ex post objective is in alignment
or conflict with what would be an ex ante efficient decision.
11In general, A’s choice of action can vary with rehypothecation, and I will address this
issue in the next section.
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In this section, I build numerical examples where B’s and the society’s
objectives are in conflict. In the first example B prefers to rehypothecate
even when rehypothecation is inefficient, and the (ex ante) social welfare will
be even greater if B can commit not to rehypothecate. In the second example
B does not rehypothecate even when rehypothecation is efficient , and the
social welfare will be even greater if B can commit to rehypothecate.
The direction of this conflict between B’s ex post objectives and the ex
ante social efficiency depends on terms of the contract between A and B;
to be specific, whether the contract involves over-collateralization or under-
collateralization from the persepective of A, or equivalently, whether A’s
private value of collateral, Z, is greater or smaller than the payment for
recovering it from B, X†.
First, in the case that the contract involves over-collateralization, B tends
to be excessively eager to rehypothecate than the socially efficient level. In-
tuitively, this is because B does not internalize a negative externality that A
suffers from not getting back his collateral in case of rehypothecation failure –
this negative externality of rehypothecation failure is reflected in the spreads
between A’s private value on his collateral and the payment for recovering it.
As a result, without considering this external cost to A when rehypotheca-
tion fails, B sometimes chooses to rehypothecate, even when rehypothecation
is not socially efficient.
Similarly, in the case that the contract involves under-collateralization, B
tends to be excessively cautious to rehypothecate, as B does not internalize
a positive externality that A enjoys from not paying the loan when B loses
A’s collateral in case of rehypothecation failure. Hence, B sometimes chooses
not to rehypothecate, even when rehypothecation is socially efficient.
1.6.1 Over-Collateralization and Excessive Rehypothecation
In this subsection, I build an example in which the contract involves over-
collateralization and there arises excessive rehypothecation. I will build this
example in parallel with the example from the previous section, picking pa-
rameter values that also induce safe behavior in the optimal contract. The
setup of the example is analogous to that of the models described in the
previous sections. For simplicity, I assume that B’s outside utility is J = 0.
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In addition, I set the parameter values to satisfy the following additional
conditions as well as Assumption 1 ∼ 5.
(i) Z0 = 0
(ii) B ≡ R− b
1−p < 0
(iii) θ ∈ ( 1
θY
, 1
θY
(
1−BθY
1−B
))
where θY is a fixed positive number.
These conditions are intuitive. First, condition (i) implies that it can never
be optimal for A to choose the risky action in any cases, either nonrehypoth-
ecation or rehypothecation, so that I can focus on the case in which A takes
the safe action. Next, Condition (ii) implies, combined with condition (i), the
optimal contract takes the form of over-collateralization. Lastly, condition
(iii) implies that B prefers to rehypothecate if θ > 1
θY
, but rehypothecation
becomes efficient only if θ > 1
θY
(
1−BθY
1−B
)
, which is above B’s cutoff to partici-
pate in rehypothecation by condition (ii).12 Then, under these assumptions,
I can show the following.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions 1 ∼ 5 and (i)-(iii), B prefers to rehy-
pothecate despite the fact that rehypothecation is inefficient,
Proof. First, note that B prefers to rehypothecate at date 1 if and only if
θY (θXs + (1− θ)Z0) > Xs (1.30)
where Xs is the payment promised by A for recovering his collateral from B.
I can show that under condition (i) and (iii), Z0 = 0 and θ >
1
θY
, the left
hand side of Equation (1.30) is greater than the right hand side, and thus B
wants to rehypothecate.
On the other hand, rehypothecation is not socially efficient if,
RIs −Xs > RI†s − θX†s − (1− θ)Z (1.31)
where Is, Xs are from Proposition 1 and I
†
s , X
†
s are from Proposition 2. The
left hand side is A’s utility under nonrehypothecation and the right hand side
12Note that since the contract involves over-collateralization, i.e., B < 0, B’s cutoff
where she participates in rehypothecation is smaller than the cutoff where rehypothecation
becomes efficient.
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is that under rehypothecation – this equals to the social welfare as I assumed
that A has all the bargaining power.
This inequality holds under the parametric restrictions (i), (ii), and (iii).
First, note that by substituting the incentive constraints to A’s utility func-
tion, I can represent it as a function of Is or I
†
s as follows.
RIs −Xs = (R− B)Is − Z,
RI†s − θX†s − (1− θ)Z = (R− B)I†s − Z. (1.32)
Also, by condition (iii), I can show that
Is =
Z
1− B >
θ2Y Z
1− BθY = I
†
s . (1.33)
Finally, plugging these into Is and I
†
s in Equation (1.32), one can derive
Inequality (1.31).
1.6.2 Under-Collateralization and Insufficient
Rehypothecation
Next, I build an example where the contract between A and B involves under-
collateralization and there arises insufficient rehypothecation.
Again, the setup of the example is analogous to that in the previous models,
and I assume that B’s outside utility is J = 0. In addition, I make the
following restrictions on the parameters beyond Assumption 1 ∼ 5.
(i’) Z0 = 0
(ii’) B ≡ R− b
1−p > 0.
(iii’) θ ∈ ( 1
θY
(
1−BθY
1−B
)
, 1
θY
)
where θY is a fixed positive number.
As in the previous example, condition (i’) implies that choosing the risky
action is never optimal for A, and thus I can focus on the case in which A
takes the safe action. Condition (ii’), combined with condition (i’), implies
that the optimal contract between A and B involves under-collateralization
– recall that by the incentive constraint (ICs), Xs < Z and X
†
s < Z, if and
only if B < 0. Lastly, condition (iii’) implies rehypothecation is efficient if
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θ > 1
θY
(
1−BθY
1−B
)
, but B wants to rehypothecates only if θ > 1
θY
, which is above
the cutoff where rehypothecation is efficient. Then, under these assumptions,
I can show the following.
Proposition 4. Under assumptions 1 ∼ 5 and (i’)-(iii’), B does not want
to rehypothecate despite the fact that rehypothecation is efficient.
Proof. First, note that if conditions (i’) and (iii’) hold, i.e., Z0 = 0 and
θ > 1
θY
, for all Xs, the following inequality holds,
θY (θXs + (1− θ)Z0) < Xs (1.34)
which implies that the expected revenue from rehypothecation, which is on
the left hand side, is smaller than the expected revenue from just keeping
collateral, which is on the right hand side, and thus B does not rehypothecate
.
Next, I want to show that condition (i’), (ii’), and (iii’) imply that rehy-
pothecation is efficient,
RIs −Xs < RI†s − θX†s − (1− θ)Z (1.35)
where Is, Xs are from Proposition 1, and I
†
s , X
†
s are from Proposition 2. And,
the left hand side is A’s expected utility under nonrehypothecation and the
right hand side is that under rehypothecation.
To show this inequality, I first plug the incentive constraints (IC ′s) and
(ICs) into A’s utility function, so that represent it as a function of only Is
and I†s , respectively.
RIs −Xs = (R− B)Is − Z,
RI†s − θX†s − (1− θ)Z = (R− B)I†s − Z. (1.32)
Then, I can compare the welfare in each case by simply comparing Is with
I†s . Also, by condition (iii’), I can show that
Is =
Z
1− B <
θ2Y Z
1− BθY = I
†
s . (1.36)
Finally, plugging these into Is and I
†
s in Equation (1.32), Inequality (1.35) is
derived.
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1.7 Conclusion
Rehypothecation is the re-use of the same collateral to support multiple
transactions. Rehypothecation helps to provide more funding liquidity to
the system by allowing the lender to use her borrower’s collateral sitting
idle in her account for another productive investment. However, it can in-
cur deadweight cost of misallocating the asset when the lender fails having
repledged the borrower’s collateral to the third party to whom the collateral
is less likely to be as valuable to the initial owner.
I show that the individuals’ incentives to participate in rehypothecation
may not be aligned with economic efficiency. In other words, cases arise
in which agents choose socially inefficient levels of rehypothecation. Im-
portantly, the direction of the inefficiency depends on terms of the agents’
contracts. If the contract involves over-collateralization, the intermediary
tends to be overly eager to rehypothecate; if the contract involves under-
collateralization, the intermediary tends to be overly cautious to rehypothe-
cate.
Several natural extensions are worth consideration. Thus far I have not
incorporated insurance motives, random fluctuation in the value of the collat-
eral, and the effects of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. These important
practical considerations are left for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
REHYPOTHECATION, COLLATERAL
MISMATCH AND FINANCIAL CRISES
2.1 Introduction
At the center of the financial crisis, there were failures of large dealer banks
that intermediated in the market for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and
repurchase agreements (repos) such as Lehman Brothers and Bear Sterns.
The failures of these banks were prompted and accelerated by runs of their
clients. For example, as Lehman Brothers headed towards bankruptcy, hedge
funds who were concerned about the solvency of their dealer banks – these
also included major dealer banks such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs
– raced to withdraw their assets from these dealer banks, shifting them into
other commercial banks deemed safer, thereby weakening the banks’ capital
position.
The concerns of these hedge funds over the solvency of the dealer banks
were rooted in the deepest part of the business of these banks: rehypoth-
ecation, a practice in which banks reuse or repledge parts of their clients’
collateral to support their own loans. Before the crisis, rehypothecation was
commonly used by dealer banks to raise extra liquidity. After the failure of
Lehman Brothers, however, many clients of these dealer banks, especially,
hedge funds, were concerned about losing access to their collateral,1 and did
not allow the banks to reuse their collateral.2 Since then, collateral reuse
1This is because in most case, if a bank defaults having repledged their clients’ collat-
eral, that collateral will be seized by third parties to whom the bank repledged it. For
example, hedge funds that used Lehman Brothers such as GLG Partners, Amber Capital
and Ramius were not able to access the assets of $40 billion held by the European branch of
Lehman Brothers (Farrell 2008), and Olivant, the investment company that used Lehman
Brothers could not participate in voting at UBS’s shareholder meeting since its 700 million
pound shares in UBS were tied up at Lehman (Mackintosh 2008).
2Singh (2010) reports that the value of rehypothecatable assets that Morgan Stanley
received from its clients decreased from $953 million in May 2008 (the peak) to $294
million in Nov 2008. Over the same period, the decrease in the amount of rehypothecatable
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has received extensive attention as an important factor that contributed the
severity of the crisis. In particular, the need to study the economic effects of
this practice has been emphasized.3
This paper studies the dynamics of an economy relying on collateral reuse
subject to aggregate uncertainty that collateral chains might fail. Building
on the model of the first chapter, I consider how a shock to collateral chains
affects individual reuse decision, collateral allocation and aggregate output.
In particular, I contrast outcomes across (i) different temporary shocks and
(ii) different persistent shocks, discussing how the size of crisis and the speed
of recovery vary with different temporary shocks, and whether a more pro-
tracted period of good states will lead to a greater output, or smaller.
As shown in the first chapter, the equilibrium haircut solves incentive prob-
lems, and this leads to a wedge between shadow values of the collateral to
parties in the collateral chain – for example, if the haircut is positive, the pri-
vate value of the collateral to the borrower exceeds the payment, that is, the
shadow value of the collateral for the lender. If the loan is over-collateralized,
parties down the chain might be tempted to overuse the collateral provided
them, and this in turn, causes parties up the chain to be unwilling to ex-
tend permission for reuse. In this chapter, I extend this work to a dynamic
setting with aggregate uncertainty that collateral chains might fail, deriving
the consequences of collateral chain shocks for the re-use decisions and the
evolution of the allocation of collateral and aggregate output.
The model highlights the trade-offs of collateral re-use, which are the main
driving forces behind the reuse decision making: (1) a positive effect that it
helps finance additional productive investments which cannot be financed
otherwise by allowing the scarce collateral to support multiple loans at once;
(2) a negative effect that it might lead to misallocation of collateral in the
event that the intermediary in the middle of the collateral chain defaults.
The misallocation of collateral arises from the assumption that collateral is
not perfectly liquid in the sense that: (a) the shadow value of collateral is
collateral by Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch are about 66% and 38%, respectively.
3However, there are still differences in the regulation of collateral reuse across countries.
For example, problems stemming from rehypothecation failure are more severe in Europe
than in the US, since in Europe, especially in the UK, there was no limit on the amount
that can be rehypothecated by broker-dealers, but in the US, SEC rule 15c3-3 restricts
the amount of client assets that can be rehypothecated to no more than 140% of the value
of the client’s liability.
31
higher for borrowers than for lenders;4 and (b) the market for collateral is
not frictionless, so that buying or selling collateral is costly. Combining these
two assumptions yields the result that collateral is misallocated in the event
that the intermediary fails, since collateral cannot be returned to borrowers
who value them highest.
A key variable that determines the relative size of these two trade-off ef-
fects is the risk of failure of the intermediary. If the risk of default of the
intermediary is lower, the positive effect to finance additional investment is
more likely to exceed the negative effect to cause collateral misallocation, so
that the initial owner is more likely to extend permission to reuse his collat-
eral; and the opposite happens if the risk of default of the intermediary is
higher. This implies that given that the risk of failure of the intermediary
tends to be counter-cyclical, collateral reuse occurs more frequently in booms
than in recessions.
Using this model, I study the effect of shocks that increase the risk of
failures of the collateral chain on dynamics of the economy. In particular,
I compare outcomes across (i) different temporary shocks and (ii) different
persistent shocks. Endogenizing the reuse decisions complicates the charac-
terization of the evolution of collateral allocation. As the shock is worse,
more collateral cannot be returned to the borrowers, increasing the misallo-
cation of collateral, while at the same time, the borrowers are less willing to
allow their counterparty to reuse their collateral with concerns of losing the
collateral, decreasing the misallocation of collateral. It follows that aggregate
output can be even greater after the adverse shock depending on the relative
size of these two opposing effects; if the effect of the shock that causes bor-
rowers not to allow collateral reuse exceeds the effect that increases failures
of returning collateral, the mismatch of collateral decreases, setting the stage
for a greater output once the shock disappears.
First, I introduce an unexpected temporary shock that increases the risk of
failure of the intermediary in the collateral chain, and compare the size of cri-
sis and the speed of recovery across shocks with different magnitude. As the
shock increases, the expected return of the intermediary’s project decreases,
which in turn causes the intermediary to reduce funding provided for the
4In this chapter, the shadow values of collateral are drived endogenously from the
persistence of investment oportunities that agents with investment opportunity today are
more likely to have investment opportunity again tomorrow than others without it.
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borrowers’ projects, both leading to a further decrease in output. Moreover,
the size of the crisis can be even greater if borrowers stop allowing collateral
reuse in response to the shock. The reason is that forbidding collateral reuse
not only causes the intermediary reduce funding for the borrowers’ project,
but also make the intermediary’s project not be undertaken at all, decreas-
ing aggregate output even further. The speed of recovery, however, can be
faster as a shock is worse if borrowers preclude collateral reuse at the time
of the shock. This is because precluding collateral reuse has a positive effect
to mitigate the misallocation of collateral in the future, leading to a faster
increase in aggregate output as the effect of shock disappears.
Next, I consider random aggregate shocks that follow a standard two-
state Markov process, and compare outcomes across two different histories
of shocks, one is uniformly better than another. In particular, I describe the
effect of continued good or bad shocks on reuse decisions and aggregate vari-
ables. I show that as bad shocks continue, borrowers are more cautious to
allow collateral reuse, and the misallocation of collateral decreases gradually,
setting the stage for a greater increase in output once the recession ends.
Conversely, as good shocks continue, borrowers are more eager to allow col-
lateral reuse, and the misallocation of collateral accrues, sowing the seeds for
a greater decrease in output once the boom ends.
The paper starts with a simple discrete time, infinite horizon model with a
continuum of ex-ante identical agents. At the beginning of each period each
agent receives either an investment opportunity or consumption goods, but
cannot have both at the same time. I assume that investment opportunities
are persistent; if an agent has an investment opportunity today, she is more
likely to have an investment opportunity again tomorrow. I assume that
consumption goods depreciate completely if not consumed immediately. An
investment opportunity requires consumption goods as input to produce more
consumption goods at the end of the period.
An investment project thus can be undertaken only if it is financed from
the outside. However, if the borrower wants to divert the funds received for
his private benefit, borrowing only backed by the future return of the project
might not be feasible. One way to restore credit in such circumstance is to
require the borrower to post other valuable assets (which is separate from
the project) as collateral; the borrower has now an incentive to repay the
loan in order to get back his collateral – thus, collateral works as hostage. I
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assume that there is one type of collateralizable asset, a long-term indivisible
asset that delivers a constant dividend for an infinite period of time (e.g. a
perpetuity). For simplicity, I assume that it is costly to hold more than one
unit of collateral, and thus an agent can hold only up to one unit of collateral.
Therefore, at any given point of time, there are four types of agents in
the economy: those who have both a project and collateral (denoted by type
AZ), those who have only a project but no collateral (type A0), those who
have both consumption goods and collateral (type CZ), and those who have
only consumption goods but no collateral (type C0). Since agents can raise
funding only with collateral, only type AZ can become borrowers. On the
other hand, since holding more than one unit of collateral is costly, only
type C0 will be lenders. I assume that borrowers and lenders are randomly
matched in the beginning of each period.
The contracting problem in a single period is similar to the model of col-
lateral chain in Kahn and Park (2016), in which there is an intermediary who
provides funding to the borrower (type AZ, here), and then subsequently re-
pledges the borrower’s collateral to borrow funding for his own project from
a third party (type C0, here). The optimal contract within a single period is
then obtained by backward induction. Based on that, I derive the value of
collateral to the borrower and for the lender endogenously.
An equilibrium is then a set of (i) the optimal reuse decision made by
borrowers in each period, (ii) the optimal contract within a single period,
and (iii) the evolution of the distribution of agent types that is consistent
with the individual optimal decisions. I show that the optimal reuse decision
made by the borrower is negatively related with the risk of failure by the
intermediary: as the probability of failure by the intermediary increases,
allowing collateral reuse is less attractive for the borrower. Also I show that
provided that the reuse decision held constant, as the probability of failure
by the intermediary increases, there are more transitions from type AZ to
A0 and from type C0 to type CZ, implying that there are more mismatch
between collateral (Z) and investment opportunities (A).
Next, I introduce a temporary unexpected shock that increases the risk of
failure by the intermediary. As mentioned earlier, the size of crisis increases
as the shock is worse, but the speed of recovery can be faster as the shock
is worse if the borrowers preclude collateral reuse at the time of the shock.
Then, I investigate the case in which aggregate shock on the collateral chain
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follows a standard two-state Markov process, comparing outcomes in two
different histories of shocks, one uniformly better than another. In particular,
I compare the reuse decision, mismatch of collateral, and aggregate output
along those two different paths, showing that continued good states can lead
to a greater decrease in output once the boom ends by accumulation of
misallocated collateral.
2.2 Model
Time is descrete with an infinite horizon and each period is indexed by
t. There are three types of agents: an entrepreneur, an intermediary, and
an investor all risk-neutral. An intermediary lives only one period and en-
trepreneurs and investors live forever and share a common discount factor
β ∈ (0, 1). An agent can become either entrepreneur or investor in each pe-
riod, depending on his endowment in that period: he might have an invest-
ment opportunity but has no input, or he might be endowed with numeraire
good that can be used as input for the investment but has no investment
opportunity.
Entrepreneurs and investors can trade only through the intemediary.5 One
can interpret enterpreneurs and investors as clients of the intermediary on
opposite sides – for example, hedge funds and money market mutual funds
of large dealer banks.
The investment opportunity requires numeraire good as an input to pro-
duce more numeraire good, R > 1 per unit of input, at the end of the period.
This implies that it is potentially useful to transfer funding from an investor
to an entrepreneur’s project.
However, an entrepreneur has the option to divert the funds that he bor-
rowed for his private benefit. The private benefit from diverting is b per unit
of funds diverted, which is assumed to be not transferable. If this benefit
from diverting is sufficiently large, without any external means of forcing
repayment of the loan, self-financing will not be feasible.6 Therefore, an
entrepreneur must post collateral to borrowing funding for his project.
In this setting, there are a collateral asset, numeraire good, and non-
5This assumption is relaxed in the third chapter.
6See the first chapter for details.
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transferable project. I assume that numeraire good is not storable, depre-
ciating completely if not consumed immediately. In contrast, the asset is
storable, producing fixed amount of numeraire good at the end of each pe-
riod, such as a perpetuity with constant dividends. I assume that each agent
can store only one unit of the collateral asset, that is, the cost of holding
more than one unit of the asset is sufficiently large.7 For simplicity, I also
assume that the asset is endowed to agents only in the initial period, t = 0,
and so the total amount of the asset is fixed in all periods.
I assume that the probability of receiving an investment opportunity in
the next period depends on the state of an agent in the current period; if an
agent has an investment opportunity today, then he will have an investment
opportunity again tomorrow with probability p, and with symmetry, if that
person does not have an investment opportunity today, he will not receive
an investment opportunity with probability p. When p > 1
2
, the investment
opportunity is persistent.
Assumption 6. p > 1
2
As a result, there are two state variables: (1) an agent has an investment
opportunity or not (have numeraire good instead of the investment opportu-
nity); and (2) an agent has the collateral asset or not. This implies that at
any given point of time there are four types of agents: entrepreneurs with col-
lateral, denoted by type “AZ,” entrepreneurs without collateral, type “A0,”
investors with collateral, type “CZ,” and lastly, investors without collateral,
type “C0.”
Note that only entrepreneurs with collateral, type AZ, can undertake the
project and only investors without collateral, type C0, and be lenders – by
assumption, investors can hold only up to one unit of collateral at one time
and so, type CZ agents remain outside of the market and consume their
numeraire good.
I assume that type AZ and C0 are randomly matched through the inter-
mediary in each period. For the time being, I assume that in any period t,
the mass of type AZ (borrowers), denoted by MAZt, is less than the mass of
type C0 (lenders), denoted by MC0t.
8
7This assumption is made in order to simplify tracking the evolution of the distribution
of asset holdings over time.
8Later, I will show that this condition holds under reasonable assumptions on param-
eters.
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Assumption 7. The initial distribution of agent types
(MAZ0 ,MA00 ,MCZ0 ,MC00) satisfies
– MA00 +MC00 ≥MAZ0 +MCZ0
– MC00 +MCZ0 ≥MAZ0 +MA00
– MC00 ≥MAZ0
First, MA00 +MC00 ≥MAZ0 +MCZ0 states that the mass of cash holders,
type A0 and C0, exceeds the mass of collateral holders, type AZ and CZ,
implying that collateral is scarce. Second, MC00 + MCZ0 ≥ MAZ0 + MA00
states that the mass of agents without investment opportunities, type C,
exceeds the mass of agents with investment opportunities, type A, implying
that investment opportunities are scarce. Lastly, MC00 ≥ MAZ0 states that
the number of lenders exceeds the number of borrowers.
2.2.1 Single period problem
I assume that the same single-period problem repeats every period, and each
period is divided into three subperiods as follows:
• At the beginning of each period, an agent becomes an entrepreneur or
an investor depending on his endowment in that period, as described
in the previous section. The entrepreneur’s project requires an imme-
diate input and he borrows funding from the intermediary by posting
collateral.
• Next the intermediary has an investment opportunity as well, but he
has no input for his project. If the borrower has allowed the intemediary
to reuse his collateral in advance, the intermediary borrows funding for
his project by transferring the borrower’s collateral to the investor.
• At the end of the period, both the entrepreneur’s and intermediary’s
projects mature. If the intermediary’s project succeeds, he recovers the
borrower’s collateral from the investor, and returns it to the borrower
in exchange for receiving the payment. However, if the intermediary’s
project fails, the investor seizes the collateral, and it cannot be returned
to the borrower.
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2.2.2 Optimal Contract within a Single Period
Note that two contracts arise sequentially: one is the contract between the
entrepreneur of type AZ (denoted by A, hereafter) and the intermediary
(denoted by B), and another is the contract between the intermediary and
the investor of type C0 (denoted by C). The optimal contract can be obtained
via backward induction. I solve the contracting problem between B and C
in the second stage taking the contract between A and B as given and then
solve the contracting problem between A and B in the first stage.
Contract between Intermediary and Investor in the Second Stage
I assume that B’s project yields Y > 1 per unit of inputs if successful and 0
if unsuccessful. The probability of success is denoted by θ ∈ (0, 1).
Assumption 8. θY > 1.
However, the return from B’s project is not pledgeable and B has to rehy-
pothecate A’s collateral in order to borrow funding from C. Throughout this
section, I assume that collateral reuse has already been allowed by A, but it
will be relaxed later on.
I assume that the contract between A and B in the first subperiod is given
by (IA, XA) where IA is the amount that A borrowed from B and XA is the
amount that A promised to repay in return for his collateral. Then, taking
the contract terms (IA, XA) between A and B in the first subperiod as given,
the optimal collateralized debt contract between B and C, (IB, XB), solves
the following problem.9
max
IB ,XB
θ(Y IB −XB +XA) (2.1)
subject to
θXB + (1− θ)VC ≥ IB (IRC)
VC ≥ XB (PB)
The objective function is B’s expected revenue from undertaking the project
by reusing A’s collateral; θ is the probability of success of B’s project; Y IB
9For simplicity, I assume that all the bargaing power goes to B.
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is the gross return from the project; XB is the payment in exchange of re-
trieving A’s collateral; and XA is the payment received from A in exchange
for returning the collateral to A.
The first constraint (IRC) is C’s participation constraint which implies
that the expected revenue from the collateralized lending (on the right side)
must not be less than the amount of funding he provided (on the left side).
The second constraint (PB) is the resource constraint which states that any
promise by B, XB, that exceeds the value of collateral to the lender, VC is
not credible.10 I also assume that the value function, VC , is given throught
this section, but will endogenize it later on.
Assumption 8 and the linearity of the problem then imply that both con-
traints bind at the optimum. Solving these two equations simultaneously
yields the optimal contract between B and C in the second stage as follows:
Lemma 4. Suppose Assumption 8 holds and the value functions of A and C
are exogenously given by VA and VC, respectively. Taking the contract between
A and B in the first stage, (IA, XA), as given, the optimal contract between
B and C in the second stage, (IB, XB), is given by
IB = XB = VC (2.2)
Hence, in this simple setting, the size of loan for B is solely determined by
the value of the collateral to C. This is mainly because of the assumptions
that the contract between B and C concerns only the insurance aspect of
collateral and C cannot condition the terms of contract between A and B.
Contract between Entrepreneur and Intermediary in the First Stage
Next, I solve for the optimal contract between the entrepreneur (A) and
the intermediary (B) in the first stage. As in the first chapter, the optimal
contract between A and B, (IA, XA), solves
max
IA,XA
RIA + θ{1 + β[pVA + (1− p)VC ]−XA} (2.3)
10For simplicity, I assume that C cannot make a deal conditional on the terms of contract
between A and B (even if C has a knowledge of the previous contracts). For example, B
cannot pledge the promise by A, XA, even in the case that it might be more profitable for
B to promise to pay XA rather than VC . For discussion of the latter case, see Kahn and
Park (2016a).
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subject to
RIA + θ{1 + β[pVA + (1− p)VC ]−XA} ≥ bIA (ICA)
θ(Y IB −XB +XA) ≥ IA (IRB)
The objective function is the entrepreneur’s payoff from undertaking the
project with collateralized borrowing; RIA is the gross return from the project
as before; θ is the probability that A receives the collateral from B; XA is the
amount paid to B in exchange for receiving the collateral; and number 1 is
the dividend from collateral and β[pVAZ + (1− p)VCZ ] is the expected value
of the collateral to A as before. Note that if B defaults, A cannot retrieve
the collateral, but at the same time, he does not need to pay the loan.
The first constraint (ICA) is the incentive constraint of A which states
that A finds it less profitable diverting funding for his own personal benefits
than exerting efferts. The second constraint is the participation constraint
of B, which can be rewritten,
θ(Y IB −XB +XA) = θ(Y − 1)VC + θXA ≥ IA (IRB)
where the equality holds by Lemma 4.
Then, under Assumption 8, the linearity of the problem ensures that both
contraints (ICA) and (IRB) bind at the optimum. Solving these two equa-
tions simultaneously yields the optimal contract between A and B.
Lemma 5. Suppose Assumption 8 holds and the value functions of A and C
are given by VA and VC, respectively. The optimal contract between A and B
in the first stage, (IA, XA), is given by
IA = θ
1 + β[pVA + (1− p)VC ] + (Y − 1)VC
1 + b−R (2.4)
XA =
1 + β[pVA + (1− p)VC ] + (b−R)(Y − 1)VC
1 + b−R (2.5)
2.2.3 Stationary Equilibrium
Next, I solve for a stationary equilibrium and provide comparative statics at
the steady state.
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Definition 1. A stationary equilibrium is a profile (IA, XA, IB, XB,MAZ ,
MA0,MCZ ,MC0) that satisfies:
• (IA, XA, IB, XB) solves the single-period problem in Lemma 4 and 5.
• (MAZ ,MA0,MCZ ,MC0) is the stationary distribution of agent types
consistent with the agents’ optimization problem.
Stationary Distribution of Types of the Agents
First, note that the transition of types between any period t and t + 1 is
given by,
MAZt+1
MA0t+1
MCZt+1
MC0t+1
 =

pθ + (1− p)(1− θ) 0 1− p 0
(2p− 1)(1− θ) p 0 1− p
(1− p)θ + p(1− θ) 0 p 0
−(2p− 1)(1− θ) 1− p 0 p


MAZt
MA0t
MCZt
MC0t
 (2.6)
where p ∈ (1
2
, 1
]
by Assumption 6.
Then, combining these result with Assumption 7 yields the equation for
the mass of each type as follows.
Lemma 6. Under Assumption7, the mass of each type of agent in period t
is given by
MAZt =
{
(1− p)
[
1− (2p− 1)tθt
1− (2p− 1)θ
]
+ (2p− 1)tθt
}
Z (2.7)
MA0t = MAt −MAZt (2.8)
MCZt = Z −MAZt = Z −
{
(1− p)
[
1− (2p− 1)tθt
1− (2p− 1)θ
]
+ (2p− 1)tθt
}
Z
(2.9)
MC0t = MCt −MCZt (2.10)
where
MAt ≡MAZt +MA0t =
1
2
{
[1 + (2p− 1)t]Z + [1− (2p− 1)t]} (2.11)
MCt ≡ CAZt + CA0t =
1
2
{
[1− (2p− 1)t]Z + [1 + (2p− 1)t]} (2.12)
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Note that this result is consistent with Assumption 7:
MAZt =
1
2
[1 + (2p− 1)t]Z < 1
2
[1 + (2p− 1)t] = MC0t ∀t (2.13)
Finally, the limiting distribution for (MAZt ,MA0t ,MCZt ,MC0t) in Lemma
6 becomes the stationary distribution of agent types.
Corollary 1. Suppose Assumption 7 holds. There exists a unique stationary
distribution of types of the agent (MAZ ,MA0,MCZ ,MC0) such that
MAZ =
1− p
1− (2p− 1)θZ (2.14)
MA0 =
1
2
(Z + 1)−MAZ (2.15)
MCZ =
p− (2p− 1)θ
1− (2p− 1)θZ (2.16)
MC0 =
1
2
(Z + 1)−MCZ . (2.17)
Note that
∂MAZ
∂p
< 0,
∂MA0
∂p
> 0,
∂MCZ
∂p
> 0, and
∂MC0
∂p
< 0 (2.18)
Value Functions
First, the value function of investor with collateral is given by,
VC = 1 + β[pVC + (1− p)VA] (2.19)
where number 1 is the earning from the asset today and β[pVC +(1−p)VA] is
the expected value of holding the asset until tomorrow. With probability p,
he remains as investor and with probability 1−p, he becomes an entrepreneur.
The value function of entrepreneur is given by,
VA = max
IA,XA
RIA + θ[−XA + {1 + β[pVA + (1− p)VC ]}] (2.20)
which is as described in Lemma 5 .
Solving these equations (2.19) and (2.20) simultaneously reveals that the
value functions of entrepreneurs (A) and cash holders (C) take the following
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forms.
Lemma 7. The value function of enterpreneurs (A) and cash holders (C)
are given by,
VA =
γθ[Y − β(2p− 1)]
1− β{p+ γθ[p+ (1− p)(Y − 1)− β(2p− 1)]} (2.21)
VC =
1− γθβ(2p− 1)
1− β{p+ γθ[p+ (1− p)(Y − 1)− β(2p− 1)]} (2.22)
where γ ≡ b
1+b−R > 1.
This yields the following comparative statics immediately.
Corollary 2 (Comparative Statics on the Value Functions).
VA > VC (2.23)
∂VA
∂p
=
> 0 if Y < 2− β< 0 otherwise ∂VC∂p < 0 (2.24)
It is noteworthy that the value function of A, VA, is now a hump-shaped
function of the persistence of investment opportunities, p; the function is
increasing in p if Y < 2 − β and decreasing in p if Y < 2 − β. The reason
is as follows. First, an increase in p has a direct positive effect on VA; it
increases VA by increasing the chance for A to receive a future investment
opportunity. However, an increase in p has another indirect effect on VA by
changing the value function of C. In particular, an increase in p decreases VC
(as it makes even more difficult for C to receive the investment opportunity
in the future). This, in turn, decreases funding that A can credibly borrow
by posting that collateral, thereby decreasing VA (recall that the value of the
collateral to A is a sum of the dividend from the collateral, and VA and VC ,
that is, 1 + β[pVA + (1− p)VC ]).
As a result, an increase in p may increase or decrease VA depending on
the relative size of these two opposing effects; if the return from reusing the
collateral is sufficiently low, that is, Y < 2 − β, the former effect outweighs
the latter effect, and so VC increases in p, but if Y > 2− β, the latter effect
outweighs the former effect, and so VC decreases in p.
Finally, I find the unique stationary equilibrium in this economy.
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Proposition 5. If Assumption 7 and 6 hold, there exists a unique stationary
equilibrium.
And the equilibrium can be represented by a profile (IA, XA, IB, XB,MAZ ,MA0,MCZ ,MC0)
where
- (IA, XA, IB, XB) is a solution to the single-period problem in Lemma 4
and 5.
- (MAZ ,MA0,MCZ ,MC0) is as described in Corollary 1.
2.2.4 Borrower’s choices of allowing rehypothecation
Up to this point, I have assumed that B can always reuse A’s collateral
whenever he has an investment opportunity. In practice, however, A has the
right to restrict B’s ability to reuse his collateral, and if the risk of losing the
collateral and the cost of recovering it are too high, he may want to preclue
B’s ability to reuse collateral. I now investigate how the probability of losing
collateral by intermediary B, 1− θ, affects A’s decisions on whether to allow
collateral re-use.
Proposition 6. An enterpreneur’s (A’s) decision on whether to allow col-
lateral re-use or not depends on the risk of intermediaries’ failure 1 − θ as
follows:
- he allows collateral reuse if
1− θ < 1− β(2p− 1)
1− β(2p− 1) + (Y − 1)[1− γβ(2p− 1)] (2.25)
and does not allow it if the inequality is reversed.
Allowing the intermediary to reuse collateral or not imposes both the ben-
efits and costs on the entrepreneur. As mentioned earlier, allowing the in-
termediary to reuse collateral reduces the opportunity costs of keeping the
collateral. This, in turn, benefits the enterpreneur since the intermediary
now would be willing to provide more funding against the same collateral.
For example, if the return from the intermediary’s project Y increases, the
right side of Equation (2.25) increases, and the entrepreneur is more likely
to allow collateral reuse. However, allowing the collateral reuse exposes the
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entrepreneur to the risk of losing collateral if the intermediary fails. For ex-
ample, if the probability of defaults of the intermediary, 1− θ, increases, the
left side of Equation (2.25) increases, and the entrepreneur is less willing to
allow collateral reuse.
2.3 Dynamics
2.3.1 The Effect of Temporary Shocks on Output Dynamics
In this section I introduce a shock that increases the risk of default by the
intermediary and investigate its effect on output dynamics. I find that even
when magnitudes of shocks are almost the same, the output dynamics trig-
gered by them can be significantly different dependingon its effect on the
entrepreneur’s choice over collateral re-use.
Specifically, this section addresses the following questions: when does a
shock induce the entrepreneurs to continue to allow collateral re-use or pre-
clude it?; how does the allocation of collateral evolve after the shock?; and
how does the size of the crisis and the speed of recovery differ between dif-
ferent shocks?
First, I show that an adverse shock increases the misallocation of collateral,
this leads to a decrease in aggregate output. However, there is another indi-
rect effect of the shock on the output dynamics by altering the entrepreneurs’
preferences over collateral re-use. If they continue to allow collateral reuse
when the shock arrives, the size of the crisis will be relatively small, but it
leads to a long economic downturn by increasing the mismatch of collateral
and investment opportunities in the long run. In contrast, if they discontinue
to allow collateral re-use, the output drops further, but it helps the economy
to recover fast by reducing the potential misallocation of collateral due to
rehypothecation failure.
Formally, I begin with a steady-state economy in which collateral reuse
is initially allowed as described in Proposition 5 and introduce a temporary
negative shock in period t.11 For a given set of parameters (β, γ, θ, p, Y ),
I characterize the range of shocks in which the borrower allows collateral
11Dynamics without rehypothecation is trivial since the aggregate output varies only
with the shocks on the borrowers’ side.
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re-use.
Lemma 8. Suppose there is a temporary negative shock ∆ ∈ (0, 1) in period
t that decreases the probability of success of B’s project from θ to (1 −∆)θ.
The borrower allows the collateral reuse in that period only if ∆ satisfies,
(1−∆)θ < 1 + β[pVA + (1− p)VC ]
1 + β[pVA + (1− p)VC ] + (Y − 1)VC (2.26)
where VA and VC are as described in Proposition 5.
The borrower will be more cautious to allow collateral reuse as the shock
∆ increases.
Next, I investigate how the distribution of agents’ types evolve after the
shock.
Proposition 7 (The Distribution of Types of Agents after the Shock). Sup-
pose the distribution of types of the agents at t = T is given by the stationary
distribution, (MAZ ,MA0,MCZ ,MC0) as described in Proposition 5.
(i) If ∆ satisfies the condition in Lemma 8, the mass of each type evolves as
follows:
MAZT = [1−∆(2p− 1)T−tθT−t]MAZ (2.27)
MA0T =
1
2
(Z + 1)−MAZT (2.28)
MCZT = MCZ + ∆(2p− 1)T−tθT−tMAZ (2.29)
MC0T =
1
2
(Z + 1)−MCZT (2.30)
(ii) If ∆ does not satisfy the condition in Lemma 8, the mass of each type of
the agents at T ≥ t evolves as follows:
MAZT =
[1 + ∆(2p− 1)(1− θ)]MAZ if T = t+ 1[1 + ∆(2p− 1)T−tθT−t−1(1− θ)]MAZ if T ≥ t+ 2 (2.31)
MA0T =
1
2
(Z + 1)−MAZT (2.32)
MCZT =
MCZ −∆(2p− 1)(1− θ)MAZ if T = t+ 1MCZ −∆(2p− 1)T−tθT−t−1(1− θ)MAZ if T ≥ t+ 2 (2.33)
MC0T =
1
2
(Z + 1)−MCZT (2.34)
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If collateral re-use is allowed at the time of the shock, the mass of type AZ
(entrepreneur with collateral) in period t + 1 falls immediately from MAZ ,
to [1−∆(2p− 1)θ]MAZ , but then it starts to increase and converges to the
steady state level, MAZ , as the effect of the shock disappears. At that same
time, the mass of type A0 and CZ move in the opposite direction of the mass
of type AZ.
If collateral re-use is prohibited at the time of the shock, however, the mass
of type AZ in period t+ 1 rises from MAZ to [1 + ∆(2p− 1)(1− θ)]MAZ at
t+ 1, but then it decreases again and converges to the steady state, MAZ , as
the effect of the shock disappears and the collateral reuse is allowed again.
Similarly, the mass of type A0 and CZ move in the opposite direction of that
of type AZ during this period.
To summarize, continuing collateral re-use at the time of the shock alle-
viates the crisis at the time of the shock and increases the misallocation of
collateral in the future, while stopping the collateral re-use at the time of the
shock increases the crisis and prevents the misallocation of collateral in the
future.
This natually leads to the following questions: what are the implication of
the collateral allocation (or misallocation) for output dynamics? And, how
does the borrower’s choice over collateral reuse affect the speed of recovery
after the shock?
Proposition 8 (The Output Dynamics after the Shock). Suppose IA and IB
are as described in Lemma 4 and 5, and IA(1) indicates IA when θ = Y = 1.
Denote MAZT and M
′
AZT
the mass of type AZ in (i) and (ii) of Proposition
7, respectively.
• If ∆ satisfies the condition in Lemma 8, the aggregate output in period
T ≥ t,YT , evolves as follows:
YT =
[RIA([1−∆]θ) + (1−∆)θY IB([1−∆]θ)]MAZT if T = t[RIA(θ) + θY IB(θ)]MAZT if T ≥ t+ 1
(2.35)
• If ∆ does not satisfy the condition in Lemma 8, the borrower in period
t does not allow the collateral reuse, and the aggregate output in period
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T ≥ t evolves as follows:
YT =
RIA(1)MAZT if T = t[RIA(θ) + θY IB(θ)]M ′AZT if T ≥ t+ 1 (2.36)
If the collateral re-use is allowed in period t, the immediate effect of the
crisis on output is relatively small: although the funding for A’s project de-
creases from IA(θ) to IA([1 − ∆]θ), B’s project is funded as well. However,
this has a negative effect to increase the collateral misallocation in the sub-
sequent periods, and thus the recovery is slower relative to the case in which
collateral re-use is prohibited – note that MAZT is greater than M
′
AZT
for all
T ≥ t+ 1.
Figure 2.1 illustates how output evolves after different temporary shocks.
I assume that the economy is initially at the steady state. The parameters
are Z = 0.9, R = 1, b = 2, Y = 2, β = 0.5, p = 0.9, θ = 0.9.
In period 3 I introduce temporary negative shocks ∆ that decrease the
probability of success of the intermediary from θ to (1−∆)θ. When the size
of the shock is smaller than ∆ = 35%, the borrower allows collateral reuse
even after the shock. When the size of the shock is ∆ = 36%, however, the
borrower switches not to allow collateral reuse after the shock. Note that the
downfall of output at the time of the shock increases as the shock is larger.
Taking the borrower’s decision unchanged in case that ∆ = 20%, 33%, the
crisis is more severe and it takes more time to recover as the size of the shock
increases. On the other hand, if the borrower’s decision changed after the
shock as in ∆ = 36%, the size of the crisis is even larger, but the economy
recovers faster than the other cases, implying that if the shock affects the
borrower’s decision to allow rehypothecation, and the dynamics after the
shock can be significantly different.
2.3.2 Stochastic Aggregate Shocks
I now consider the possibility that aggregate shocks randomly arrive. I as-
sume that the counterparty shock θ follows a two-state Markov chain where
θ ∈ {θL, θH} with θL ≤ θH and let
piij = Pr(θt+1 = θj|θt = θi) i, j ∈ {H,L}. (2.37)
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Figure 2.1: Output dynamics after different temporary shocks (the size of
shock is ∆ = 20% (blue dashed), ∆ = 33% (blue solid), and ∆ = 36% (red))
That is, piLL and piHH capture the persistence of bad and good states: higher
piLL and piHH , greater persistence in bad and good states, respectively. If
piLL or piHH equals 1, the state remains to be either θL or θH forever, once
reached (and, it boils down to the previous case with no persistent aggregate
shocks).
Equilibrium
As in the previous analysis, in equilibrium, the entrepreneurs’ collateral
reuse decision in any period t maximizes expected payoff given a state θt ∈
{θL, θH}, the optimal single-period contract (IA(θt), Xt(θt), IB(θt), XB(θt)) as
in Lemma 4 and 5, and a present value of holding on collateral to the next
period,
∑
j∈{H,L} piij[pVA(θj) + (1 − p)VC(θj)]. This determines the evolu-
tion of the distribution of types of the agents over time along any path of
aggregate shocks (θ1, θ2, . . .). As a result, the equilibrium consists of the op-
timal decision rule on collateral reuse, the optimal single-period contract, the
value functions of each type of the agents, and the distribution of types of
the agents over time that is consistent with the optimization by agents.
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First, the value function of entrepreneurs (A) is given by,
VA(θi) ≡ max
{
RIA(θi)+θi
[
1+β
∑
j∈{H,L}
piij[pVA(θj)+(1−p)VC(θj)]−XA(θi)
]
,
RIˆA + 1 + β
∑
j∈{H,L}
piij[pVA(θj) + (1− p)VC(θj)]− XˆA
}
(2.38)
where (IA(θi), XA(θi)) are in Proposition 5 and (IˆA, XˆA) ≡ (IA(θ = 1, Y =
1), XA(θ = 1, Y = 1)). The first term means the value of allowing collateral
reuse and the second term means the value of not allowing collateral reuse
at state θi. This shows that enterpreneurs choose whether to allow collateral
reuse or not to allow it optimally. And the value function of cash holders (C)
is given by,
VC(θi) ≡ 1 + β
∑
j∈{H,L}
piij[(1− p)VA(θj) + pVC(θj)] (2.39)
The evolution of the distribution of types that are consistent with the
collateral reuse decisions is given by,
MAZt+1
MA0t+1
MCZt+1
MC0t+1
 =

λt[pθt + (1− p)(1− θt)] + (1− λt)(1− p) 0 1− p 0
λt[(2p− 1)(1− θt)] p 0 1− p
λt[(1− p)θt + p(1− θt)] + (1− λt)(1− p) 0 p 0
−λt[(2p− 1)(1− θt)] 1− p 0 p


MAZt
MA0t
MCZt
MC0t

(2.40)
where θt ∈ {θL, θH}, p ∈
(
1
2
, 1
]
as in Assumption 6, and λt ∈ {0, 1} where
λt = 1 means that collateral reuse is allowed and λt = 0 means that collateral
reuse is not allowed.
If piLL or piHH equals 1, the state θL or θH is absorbing in the sense that
it is never left once reached.12 Then, with the state constant over time, the
mass of entrepreneurs with collateral, MAZ , converges to either
(1−p)Z
1−θH(2p−1) or
12The analysis here closely follows [2].
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Z
2
(where Z is the initial endowment of collateral), the mass of enterpreneurs
with collateral induced by an arbitrarily long sequence of θ = θH and θ = θL,
respectively – by assumption above, if θ = θL, collateral reuse does not occur,
so that MAZ is independent of θ.
Let M
{θτ}tτ=0
AZt
(MAZ0) denote the mass of entrepreneurs with collateral t
periods after following sequence of states {θτ}tτ=0, starting from the mass
MAZ0 . Then it leads to the following lemma immediately.
Lemma 9. Suppose Assumption 7 holds. For θ ∈ {θL, θH}, if collateral reuse
is allowed only when θ = θH , then,
(i) The interval
[
(1−p)Z
1−θH(2p−1) ,
Z
2
]
is absorbing in the sense that given any
initial MAZ0 ∈
[
(1−p)Z
1−θH(2p−1) ,
Z
2
]
, for any sequence of states {θτ}tτ=0,
M
{θτ}tτ=0
AZt
(MAZ0) ∈
[
(1−p)Z
1−θH(2p−1) ,
Z
2
]
(ii) For any MAZ0 /∈
[
(1−p)Z
1−θH(2p−1) ,
Z
2
]
,
lim
t→∞
Prob
({
{θτ}tτ=0
∣∣∣∣M{θτ}tτ=0AZt (MAZ0) ∈ [ (1− p)Z1− θH(2p− 1) , Z2
]})
= 1
Effects of Prolonged Shocks on Output Dynamics
Here, I focus on the case in which enterpreneurs allows collateral reuse if
θ = θH and do not allow it if θ = θL, that is, the decision on collateral reuse
depends on the state of the economy. I study the impact of persistence of
aggregate shocks – that is, either good (θH) or bad (θL) states continues for
a long time – on the output dynamics.
Specifically, I contrast the output dynamics in two economies that start
from the same state, but one is followed by a prolonged period of good states
(θH , θH , . . . , θH) and another is followed by a prolonged period of bad states,
(θL, θL, . . . , θL).
A key factor that determines aggregate output in this economy is the
amount of collateral held by entrepreneurs, MAZ : collateral can be used for
more efficient investments only if it is held by entrepreneurs, otherwise it
simply yields a fixed dividend which is less than the outcome of the project.
Other things equal, as more collateral is assigned to entrepreneurs, the output
tends to be larger.
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Counterintuitively, the next result shows that the long period of continued
good shocks might lead to a smaller output in the future. The intuition is
as follows. In a boom, the risk of losing collateral is relatively small and so
borrowers tend to allow rehypothecation too frequently, thereby accumulat-
ing misallocated collateral in the economy. In contrast, in recession, the risk
of losing collateral is relatively large and so borrowers are reluctant to allow
rehypothecation, thereby preventing potential misallocation of collateral due
to rehypothecation failure. To summarize, when the borrower’s decisions are
affected by shocks, the number of entrepreneurs with collateral, MAZ , dimin-
ishes over time as long as good shocks continue, while it rises over time as
long as bad shocks continue. Taking these results with the fact that aggre-
gate output is an increasing function of MAZ , this implies that output can be
even smaller after continued good shocks than after continued bad shocks.
Figure 2.2 illustates how continued good shocks can lead to smaller output
than continued bad shocks. I assume that the economy is initially in a
long run equilibrium in the sense that MAZ initially lies within the interval,[
(1−p)Z
1−θH(2p−1) ,
Z
2
]
. I set parameters as follows: β = .5, Z = .9, R = 1.45, b =
1.5, Y = 1.4, p = .95, θ = .92, and piij = .5 for all i, j ∈ {H,L}. And under
these parameter values, it can be also verified that: (i) the borrower wants to
allow rehypothecation only in the good state H; (ii) the intermediary wants
to reuse collateral ex post if rehypothecation has been allowed in advance;
(iii) the borrower prefers to invest by delivering collateral rather than holding
on to it in both good and bad states.
Note that if good shocks continue, MAZ decreases over time, while if bad
shocks continue, MAZ increases over time, showing that misallocation of col-
lateral increases during the boom (see Figure 2.3). As explained above, this
plays a major role in determining aggregate output, and Figure 2.2 shows that
aggregate output following bad shocks exceeds that following good shocks in
period 22.
2.4 Conclusion
Collateral is important for financing investments; without it, firms may find
it difficult to obtain loans to fund their projects. However, collateral is scarce,
and one way to economize on the limited amount of collateral is to“re-use”
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Figure 2.2: Output dynamics with continued good shocks (blue) and bad
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of MAZ with continued good shocks (blue) and bad
shocks (red)
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or rehypothecate it, making it support multiple transactions at once.
I have constructed a dynamic model in which collateral reuse plays an im-
portant role in output fluctuations. In the model, the allocation of collateral
is a key determinant of aggregate output and the risk of default by the inter-
mediary initiates output fluctuations; a shock that increases the risk of failure
of the collateral chain leads to the mismatch of collateral and investment op-
portunities, decreasing output. In addition, the output dynamics after the
shock depend on the borrowers’ decision on collateral reuse; with concerns of
losing collateral, they might preclude the intermediary from reusing their col-
lateral. If they prohibit collateral reuse, then the crisis is more severe while
it helps the economy to recover faster by preventing potential mismatch of
collateral in the future.
A future research is to extend the model into a richer setting such as: (i)
the borrowers have heterogeneous valuations on collateral, and so the choices
of allowing collateral reuse might differ across them; (ii) the asset market is
available, and the borrower who lose collateral can repurchase it from the
market with some costs.
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CHAPTER 3
EMERGENCE OF REHYPOTHECATION
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I develop a simple model in which rehypothecation occurs as
an optimal choice when a borrower faces two alternative ways of financing.
One option is to borrow funding directly from a cash holder (direct financ-
ing), another option is to borrow funding through an intermediary (indirect
financing). With direct financing, the borrower delivers collateral directly
to the cash holder, and this incurs some transaction costs. With indirect fi-
nancing, the borrower delivers collateral to the intermediary who then lends
(rehypothecates) it to the cash holder, and this exposes the borrower with
the risk of losing collateral in case that the intermediary defaults. Thus, the
borrower’s choice of financing depends on the relative cost associated with
each method of finance.
In particular, I investigate the effect of moral hazard on the part of the
borrower on the cost of each financing and the borrower’s choice of method of
finance. If the intermediary’s default risk is exogenous, as the moral hazard
problem gets more severe, the borrower is less concerned by the default risk
of the intermediary, inducing the borrower to choose indirect financing more
frequently. However, if the intermediary’s default risk is endogenous, as
the moral hazard problem gets more severe, the cost of effort made by the
intermediary to prevent default also increases. As a result, indirect financing
is inferior to direct financing both if the severity of the moral hazard problem
is too small or too large.
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3.2 Model
3.2.1 Direct financing
All agents are risk neutral; there is no discounting. Agent A has a project
that yields a payoff of R > 1 tomorrow per unit of input invested today.
However, A has no inputs for the project and has to borrow funding. There
are a large number of competitive agents C, each has (a sufficiently large
amount of) inputs for A’s project. However A can avoid repaying the loan:
he can divert what he borrows to gain a private benefit of b per unit of funds
diverted.
Assumption 9. R > b > R− 1.
The first inequality implies that investing in the project is more efficient
than diverting as the return from the project R is greater than the private
benefit to the borrower from diverting b (both measured per unit invested).
However, the second inequality means that the benefit from diverting b is
greater than the project’s net return R − 1, and thus self-financing (or un-
collateralized borrowing) is not feasible.
Suppose A delivers an asset that he possesses as collateral to C in exchange
for funding for his project. The collateral asset is indivisible and has the value
of holding it tomorrow is Z > 0 to A but zero to C. Thus A wants to retrieve
it from C (and C does not want to retain it) at the end.1 I assume that the
surplus that C gains from temporarily holding the collateral asset is given
by Vc > 0.
2 In addition, there is a transaction cost of T > 0 which is borne
by A.
In such scenario a contract between A and C is a profile (I,X) where I is
the amount of funds that A initially borrows from C in exchange for pledging
the asset as collateral and X is the amount that A pays C in exchange for
receiving the collateral back. The optimal contract maximizes A’s payoff
subject to (1) a incentive constraint that prevents A from diverting the funds
1Heterogeneity in the value of the asset can arise for various reasons; the asset might
be an important component of the borrower’s portfolio, the borrower needs the asset to
gain voting rights, or the borrower might have technologies and opportunities to use his
asset efficiently, which are not available to others.
2For example, C borrows the asset from A to sell it short, or to hedge other investments,
or to own the record of dividends for some accounting or tax reasons, as documented by
Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2002).
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borrowed and (2) a participation constraint that ensures C’s payoff to be
greater than a certain reservation value. In what follows I assume that A has
all the bargaining power and set the reservation value of B to 0. Thus, the
optimal contracting problem is as follows:
max
I,X
RI −X + Z − T (3.1)
subject to
RI −X + Z ≥ bI (ICA)
Vc +X − I ≥ 0 (PC)
Lemma 10. There exists a solution to the contracting problem (3.1). The
solution is unique and takes a form of (I,X) where
I =
Vc + Z
1 + b−R, X =
(R− b)Vc + Z
1 + b−R . (3.2)
Proof. This is a special case of Lemma 11, proved below.
To interpret this result, I write the incentive constraint of the borrower as
follows:
(R− b)I + Z ≥ X (3.3)
implying that the most that lenders can be promised is the sum of the pledge-
able income (R− b)I – the remaining outcome of the project after paying a
rent of bI to the borrower – and the value of collateral to the borrower Z.
Similarly the participation constraint of the lender can be rewritten as
Vc +X ≥ I (3.4)
implying that the most that lenders are willing to provide is the sum of the
value of collateral to lenders (or the value of holding collateral temporarily)
and the amount that lenders are promised to be paid. Combining these, a
maximum investment scale is
I =
1
1− (R− b)(Vc + Z) (3.5)
where 1
1−(R−b) > 1 is the multiplier, the inverse of the minimum equity ratio:
57
for each unit of investment, the borrower can raise R − b from outside, but
must cover the remaining part 1− (R− b) by his own wealth. For example,
a borrower with a minumum equity ratio of 25% can invest a maximum of
4(= 1/.25) per unit of own asset value.
Finally, at the maximum investment scale the borrower’s payoff is
bI =
b
1− (R− b)(Vc + Z)
Since R > 1 by assumption, the rate of return on the borrower’s collateral
b
1−(R−b) is greater than 1. As a result, the internal value of collateral to the
borrower, the right side of the above equation, exceeds the market value of
collateral to lenders, Vc + Z.
3.2.2 Indirect financing
Consider the following scenario: A borrows funding from an intermediary B
in exchange for delivering his asset and specifies that B may reuse the col-
lateral. Having provided funding for A, B then lends (rehypothecates) the
collateral to C who needs it temporarily. The transaction through interme-
diary B saves A the transaction costs – in other words, T becomes zero – but
exposes A to the risk of not getting back the collateral if B defaults, which
occurs with probability 1− p ∈ (0, 1).3
The contracting problem in this scenario is solved by backward induction:
the arrangement between B and C is solved by taking the terms agreed on
between A and B as given, and with foreknowledge of the contract between
B and C in the second stage, A and B make the initial contract.
The contract between B and C is straightforward: because C is compet-
itive, the revenue to B from lending (rehypothecating) the collateral is the
surplus to C from temporarily using collateral, Vc. Then, the conditions of
the contract between A and B can be described as before: A receives funding
I for his project from B in exchange for delivering the asset; if B does not
default, A makes the prearranged payment X to B in return for the collateral
and if B defaults, A loses the collateral and does not pay X.
Assuming that A has all the bargaining power and B’s reservation utility
3In this section, I assume that this default probability is exogenous and not correlated
with rehypothecation. In the subsequent section, I consider the case where p is endogenous.
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is zero, the optimal contract between A and B solves
max
I,X
RI + p(Z −X) (3.6)
subject to
RI + p(Z −X) ≥ bI (ICA)
Vc + pX − I ≥ 0 (P ′B)
Lemma 11. Suppose p > 0. There exists a solution to the contracting prob-
lem (3.6). The solution is unique and takes a form of (I,X) where
I =
Vc + pZ
1 + b−R, X =
p−1(R− b)Vc + Z
1 + b−R (3.7)
Proof. If p > 0, a necessary and sufficient condition for a solution (I,X) is
the existence of a quartet (I,X, λ, µ) satisfying the following conditions:
R + λ(R− b)− µ = 0
−p− pλ+ pµ = 0
RI + p(Z −X) ≥ bI; λ ≥ 0
Vc + pX − I ≥ 0 µ ≥ 0
where λ and µ are the multipliers on (ICA) and (P
′
B), respectively, and
the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. The equalities
simplify to
λ =
R− 1
b−R + 1
µ =
b
b−R + 1
both of which are positive by Assumption 9. Therefore, both conditions
(ICA) and (P
′
B) bind, and (3.7) follows. Note that by Assumption 9, both I
and X in (3.7) are positive. Also note that when p = 1 this problem reduces
to the previous section.
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Note that A’s payoff in this problem becomes
b
1− (R− b)(Vc + pZ) (3.8)
which can be interpreted in a similar way as in the previous case.
The payoff in this problem has to be compared with the payoff from direct
financing in Equation (3.2.1) to derive the condition under which A chooses
intermediation over direct financing.
Proposition 9. The borrower chooses indirect financing if and only if
(1− p) b
1− (R− b)Z < T. (3.9)
The left side is the expected loss of value from losing collateral when the
intermediary defaults: the probability of default 1 − p multiplied by the
internal value of collateral to the borrower b
1−(R−b)Z (where
b
1−(R−b) is the
rate of return on collateral if the borrower invests and Z is the value of
collateral to the borrower). The right side is the transaction cost of the
direct financing. As the value of collateral to the borrower decreases or the
transaction cost increases, the borrower is more likely to choose the indirect
financing.
Equation (3.9) also shows that b has two opposing effects on the borrower’s
choice: as b increases, the rent to the borrower increases while the equity mul-
tiplier, the inverse of the minumum equity ratio, 1
1−(R−b) decreases. However,
if R > 1, the latter effect dominates the former effect,
d
db
(
b
1− (R− b)
)
=
1−R
[1− (R− b)]2 < 0,
which yields the following result.
Corollary 3. As b increases the borrower is more likely to choose the indirect
financing.
In other words, if the default risk is exogenous, as the moral hazard problem
gets more severe, the borrower is more likely to choose the indirect financing
rather than the direct financing.
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3.3 Endogenous default risk
In the previous analysis I assumed that the probability that the intermediary
fails 1 − p is exogenous. Suppose instead that this probability varies with
the efforts made by the intermediary: increasing effort by the intermediary
lowers the probability of default and its cost to the intermediary.
Let p(x) be the repayment probability where x represents the interme-
diary’s effort costing x. I assume the function p is increasing and strictly
concave, with p(0) = 0, limx→∞ p(x) = 1, p′(0) =∞, and limx→∞ p′(x) = 0.
Given X, the intermediary chooses x to maximize
p(x)X − x.
So that the choice is defined by
p′(x)X = 1 (ICB)
The contracting problem chooses x, X, and I to maximize
RI + p(x)(Z −X) (3.10)
subject to
RI + p(x)(Z −X) ≥ bI (ICA)
Vc + p(x)X − x ≥ I (PB)
p′(x)X = 1 (ICB)
x ≥ 0, I ≥ 0, X ≥ 0
To solve this problem, I need to simplify the problem as follows.
Lemma 12. In any optimum, Vc + p(x)X − x = I.
Proof. Suppose not. Then increase I until this is the case; it does not violate
any constraint, and improves the objective.
Thus I can rewrite the problem as follows.
max
I,X,x
R[Vc + p(x)X − x] + p(x)(Z −X) (3.11)
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subject to
(R− b)[Vc + p(x)X − x] + p(x)(Z −X) ≥ 0 (ICA)
p′(x)X = 1 (ICB)
x ≥ 0, I ≥ 0, X ≥ 0
Lemma 13. There exists a solution to this problem.
Proof. The set of feasible solutions is non empty (let X = Z and x satisfy
p′(x)Z = 1, for example). Now the right side of (ICA)
(R− b)[Vc + p(x(X))X − x(X)] + p(x(X))(Z −X)
where x(X) = p′−1
(
1
X
)
. This is decreasing in X for X > Z, since (R −
b − 1)p(x) + [p′(x)Z − 1]x′(X) < 0 for X ≥ Z. There exists X¯ ∈ (Z,∞)
such that (ICA) does not hold for any X > X¯. As a result, the feasible set
X satisfying (ICA) is bounded above by X¯ and so the set of feasible pairs
(X, x) is closed and bounded. Since the objective function is continuous, a
maximum exists for the problem.
Now rewrite the problem further as
max
X
R[Vc + p(x(X))X − x(X)] + p(x(X))(Z −X) (3.12)
subject to
(R− b)[Vc + p(x(X))X − x(X)] + p(x(X))(Z −X) ≥ 0 (ICA)
X ≥ 0
where x(X) = p′−1
(
1
X
)
and p′−1 is the inverse function of p′.
Lemma 14. In any optimum, X > Z.
Proof. Suppose X ≤ Z. Then we know that
(R− b)[Vc + p(x(X))X − x(X)] + p(x(X))(Z −X) > 0
because the conditions on the function p guarantee that p(x(X))X − x > 0
for all X. So that we consider the unconstrained maximum: first order
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conditions are
(R− 1)p(x(X)) + p′(x(X))x′(X)(Z −X) = 0
At any such unconstrained maximum we have
X − Z = (R− 1)p(x(X))
p′(x(X))x′(X)
> 0.
However, this contradicts X ≤ Z. Therefore, X > Z.
Lemma 15. There is a unique value of X, call it X1, such that the constraint
(ICA) holds with equality.
Proof. From above, we know the constraint does not bind for any X ≤
Z. Also the derivative of the right side of (ICA) is negative for X > Z.
Therefore, there is unique value of X1(> Z) where the constraint is binding.
Lemma 16. If the function
(R− 1)p(x(X))− x′(X)[1− p′(x(X))Z]
is positive in the range X ∈ (Z,X1) where x(X) = p′−1
(
1
X
)
, the solution to
the maximization problem is X = X1, I = Vc + p(x(X1))X1 − x(X1), and
x(X) = p′−1
(
1
X1
)
.
Proof. Clear, since the objective function is monotonic over the interval.
One simple sufficient conditions for this is
(R− 1)p(x(Z))− x′(Z) > 0 and x′′ < 0. (3.13)
which is equivalent to
(R− 1)p(p′−1(Z−1)) + 1
p′′(p′−1(Z−1))Z2
> 0
and
2Z[p′′(p′−1(Z−1))]2 > p′′′(p′−1(Z−1)).
To summarize, we reach to the following proposition.
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Proposition 10. If (R−1)p(p′−1(Z−1))+ 1
p′′(p′−1(Z−1))Z2 > 0 and 2Z[p
′′(p′−1(Z−1))]2
> p′′′(p′−1(Z−1)), there exists a unique solution to the problem (3.12) such
that X = X1, I = Vc + p(x(X1))X1 − x(X1), and x(X1) = p′−1
(
1
X1
)
.
Comparing A’s payoff in each case, the condition under which intermedi-
ation is preferred to direct trade is
b
1− (R− b) [{1− p(x(X))}Z + x(X)] < T. (3.14)
For the purpose of analysis, let p(x) = 1− 1
1+ax
where a ∈ R+. At optimum,
x(X) =
√
X
a
− 1
a
p(x(X)) = 1− 1√
aX
I(X) =
1
1− (R− b)
[
Vc +
(
1− 1√
aX
)
Z −
(√
X
a
− 1
a
)]
and X is a solution to the following equation
1
1− (R− b)
{
(R− b)
(
1− 1√
aX
)−1 [
Vc −
(√
X
a
− 1
a
)]
+ Z
}
−X = 0.
(3.15)
Using the result in Equation (3.14), the indirect financing is preferred to
the direct financing if and only if
b
1− (R− b)
[
1√
aX
Z +
(√
X
a
− 1
a
)]
< T
Note that the rate of return of investment, b
1−(R−b) , increases in b. Provided
that X decreases in b, the probability of default increases in b and the cost
of effort decreases in b. Therefore, the effect of b on the choice of financing
is non-monotonic: if b is small, the probability of default is large, and if b is
large, the cost of efforts is large, in both cases, the indirect financing tends
to be less profitable than the direct financing.
Corollary 4. If T > T , there exists b¯ and b such that the borrower chooses
the indirect financing if and only if b ∈ (b, b¯) and chooses the direct financing
otherwise.
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The following figures illustate the effects of b on the choice of financing if
R = 2, VC = 4, Z = 11 and a = 1.
4
2 4 6 8
b
8
10
12
14
T
Indirect	financing
Direct	financing
Figure 3.1: Effect of b on the cost of intermediation
3.4 Conclusion
A fundamental tradeoff between indirect financing and direct financing is
that indirect financing saves the cost of finding lenders (transaction cost),
but it exposes the borrower to the risk of losing collateral in case that the
intermediary defaults. The borrower may then prefer direct financing which
guarantees the return of collateral but incurs the transaction cost.
In particular, I investigate how the choice of financing is affected by moral
hazard of the borrower. Taking the intermediary’s default risk as given con-
stant, as the borrower’s moral hazard is more severe, the borrower is less
concerned of losing collateral, and the indirect financing is chosen more fre-
quently. However, if the intermediary’s default risk is endogenous, the result
is non monotonic. If the borrower’s moral hazard is small, the intermediary
does not make sufficient effort to avoid default. On the other hand, if the
moral hazard is severe, the intermediary has to make too much costly effort
4This set of parameters satisfy the condition in Proposition 10.
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to alleviate it. As a result, in both cases, the cost of the indirect financing
tends to be large.
Important future works would be to consider how rehypothecation differs
from other common ways of intermediation such as collecting deposits and
issuing loans.
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